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ABSTRACT 
Background: Previous research has indicated that shame can interfere with ‘positive’ 
therapeutic outcomes, as they are understood in most psychological frameworks. It has 
also been argued that the ways clinicians conceptualise it can impact therapeutic work. 
However, no study up to now has examined therapists’ understandings of shame in the 
therapeutic process.  
Aims: Informed by a social constructionist epistemology, this research aimed to 
explore how therapists construct shame. It examined the subjectivities produced and 
utilised in therapists’ talk and their implications for practice. A novel method called 
‘story completion’ was used, whereby the researcher collects data in the form of 
written narratives. FDA was applied to the discourse collected from forty-five 
therapists, who were asked to complete a ‘story-stem’ describing a therapist dealing 
with a client’s shame.  
Findings: In most stories, shame was constructed around the concept of a unified self, 
which was hidden behind shame-related behaviours. Therapists’ were discoursed as 
‘experts’, who utilise different practices, in order to make the client ‘talk’ about their 
hidden experiences and ‘overcome’ their shame. Arguably, in this position, the 
therapist’s role was constructed as necessary in promoting psychological change. 
Alternatively, therapists were conceptualised in more ‘humane’ terms as vulnerable 
and affected by the intensity of shame. Vulnerability was seen as reducing the 
‘credibility’ of the therapist and, thus psychotherapy as a wider institution. It was 
suggested that this discourse sits in opposition with the discourse of ‘expertise’ and 
has implications for therapeutic practice and power. 
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Conclusions: This thesis contended that clinicians need to be sceptical about taken-
for-granted values of psychotherapy, including therapists’ ‘expertise’. They also need 
to be mindful of the ways that dominant psychological theories may conceal the power 
struggles in the therapy room and reflect on the ways they frame their clients’ 
emotions.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Understandings of Shame 
The etymological root of the word ‘shame’ is thought to derive from the ancient, 
Teutonic word ‘skam’ and the pre-Teutonic word ‘skem’, which means ‘covering’ or 
‘covering oneself’ (Hurtado-de-Mendoza, Molina & Fernández-Dols, 2013). In line 
with these definitions, in the Bible, shame was graphically represented by Adam’s fall 
and the attempt to ‘hide’ in order to avoid exposure before God (Seu, 2006), whilst 
phenomenological descriptions, such as avoidance of gaze or the characteristic ‘tilted 
head’ also engender a wish to conceal and avoid interaction (Lewis, 1992). Nowadays, 
the concept of shame has gained a lot of attention in psychological and 
psychotherapeutic literature, although our ways of understanding it are not that 
different. In mainstream theories, shame is still being described as “the hidden 
emotion” (Gans & Weber, 2010, p. 3), as a “disparity between the ideal self and the 
actual, real self” (Cook, 1987, p. 16) or “a tension between the ego and the ego ideal” 
(Morrison, 2011, p. 27).  
Taken together, these definitions emphasise shame’s action tendency to ‘cover’ one’s 
‘flaws’ from being exposed to a ‘threatening’ other (Wumser, 1981) and introduce us 
to the diversity of shame theories, which are rooted in different schools of thought 
(Gilbert, 1998). As will be seen below, shame has been conceptualised from a variety 
of approaches, including cognitive behavioural (e.g. Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; 
Klass, 1990) and psychodynamic (e.g. Morrison, 1987; 2011). Although each one of 
them carries different assumptions in regard to the ways it can impact the therapeutic 
process, most of the concepts are based on an understanding of shame as a purely 
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psychological, internal state. Indeed, in mainstream psychological theories, shame is 
constructed around the concept of an individual’s ‘innermost, real self’, as described 
in the above quotes, and is often discussed as part of the group of ‘self-conscious 
emotions’ (Tracy, Robins & Tangney, 2007). It could be argued that a common, 
underlying assumption of these theories is that the self is a ‘natural entity’ about which 
there is a discoverable truth (Madill & Doherty, 1994). 
In more recent studies though, it has been suggested that by discoursing shame around 
the concept of the individual’s self, dominant theories construct it as a “context-free, 
intrapsychic variable” (Leeming & Boyle, 2004, p.1). According to the researchers, 
these understandings have distracted theorists from examining its management within 
a particular sociocultural context and have made the wider, social factors implicated 
in shame less visible. Postmodern theories have also problematised the concept of 
emotions as internal intrapsychic forces, as well as the construct of the individual, 
authentic self, altogether. Gergen (1995, 2011) suggested that both these constructs 
tend to be taken for granted within most psychological paradigms. However, they 
could be seen as detaching emotions from their context, and not paying sufficient 
attention to the influence of the wider socio-cultural framework (Leeming & Boyle, 
2013). In the context of therapy for example-as I am further discussing in the next 
sections, therapists’ personal values as well as wider assumptions about the nature of 
emotions and/or the purpose of therapy can have an impact on how shame is 
understood in the therapy room. 
Based on the limited investigation of shame as part of a particular sociocultural 
framework, within the next sections, I am going to argue for a social constructionist 
perspective as a way to explore shame within the therapeutic context. Social 
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constructionism is an epistemological stance that understands human experience as 
socially, historically and linguistically mediated (Burr, 2003). In accordance with 
poststructuralist theories, I aim to critically examine taken-for-granted assumptions 
about the conceptualisation and management of emotions within the therapeutic 
framework. It is suggested that dominant psychological theories can provide useful 
perspectives on our understanding of shame. When they are perceived as ‘taken-for-
granted truths’ though, they can limit our understanding of the phenomenon and what 
we can do or feel in relation to it (Avdi & Georgaka, 2007). 
 
1.2. Overview of Study  
 Psychotherapeutic literature has shown an increasing interest in shame over the last 
twenty years (Gilbert et al., 2010), approaching it from various epistemological 
stances. Most empirical studies come from a positivist perspective and have focussed 
on the links between shame and the maintenance of psychological disturbance. In 
previous studies, shame has been related to several difficulties, including eating 
disorders (Swan & Andrews, 2003), depression (Cheung, Gilbert, & Irons, 2004; Hook 
& Andrews, 2005) and anxiety (Gilbert, 2000). It has also been suggested that shame-
related behaviours, such as withdrawal or non-disclosure can have a negative impact 
on the therapeutic relationship and interfere with positive therapeutic outcomes, as 
they are understood in most forms of therapy (Black, Curran & Dyer, 2013; McDonald 
& Morley, 2001). Indeed, it could be argued that if one believes that their ‘self’ is 
intractably defective and has a desire to hide from others, as described above, they will 
possibly refrain from ‘being open’ and developing an intimate therapeutic bond, which 
is seen as a therapeutic ideal in most therapeutic approaches (Gergen, 1995).  
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1.2.1. Rationale and Aims of the Study 
The above studies bring attention to the links between shame, psychological 
difficulties and the quality of the therapeutic relationship. Despite the emphasis on 
these issues, shame has received relatively little attention in the empirical literature 
compared to other emotions (Leeming & Boyle, 2011). Furthermore, we know very 
little about the ways it can interfere with the therapeutic work. Two studies that 
examined shame from a phenomenological perspective suggested that the ways that 
therapists1 understand and process it can have a great impact on how it is managed 
during therapy (Miller & Draghi-Lorenz, 2005; Petter, 2010). In accordance with this 
view, Willig (2008) argued that practitioners’ conceptualisations of certain phenomena 
could influence how they deal with them in clinical practice. However, according to 
my knowledge, no study up to now has examined therapeutic practitioners’ 
understandings of shame.  
Given the limited investigation of shame in the context of therapy and the lack of 
studies about therapist’s constructions of the phenomenon, in this study, I aim to 
explore the ways that shame is discursively constructed by therapeutic practitioners. 
Discursive approaches assume that the way we talk about particular phenomena has 
an impact on social and psychological life by reproducing or challenging culturally 
dominant understandings of them (Georgaka & Avdi, 2009). Discourses are 
understood as strongly related to power and thus, discourse analysis pays attention to 
power relations and aims to interrogate taken-for-granted ways of understanding 
realities (Willig, 2008). Due to the diversity of approaches and paradigms in relation 
 
1 Please note that I use the terms ‘therapist’ and ‘therapeutic practitioner’ interchangeably, referring to 
therapists, psychologists or psychiatrists who identify themselves as ‘working therapeutically’, utilising different 
therapeutic modalities. 
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to shame it was thought that an approach that challenges the concept of ‘one reality’ 
that applies to all contexts (Burr, 2003) would be appropriate.  
By exploring these processes, this study aims to help therapeutic practitioners 
understand how they frame their clients’ emotions, as well as the ways they are 
constrained or liberated by their engagement in different discourses about them. 
Moreover, this study attempts to make both therapists and supervisors aware of their 
active role and their contribution to the client’s direction of change and promote 
“socially aware therapy” (Georgaca & Avdi, 2009, p. 159; Spong, 2010). 
Understanding these processes is key to the maintenance of a critical reflective stance 
towards clinical practice and central to the counselling psychology identity (British 
Psychological Society (BPS), 2017a).  
 
Thus, in the first part of this study, I will offer a review of the literature in order to map 
out the discursive landscape of shame and gain an understanding of the different 
discourses and their functions within different sociohistorical contexts. Then, I will 
focus on shame in the context of therapy and  explore how therapeutic practitioners 
construct shame, applying Foucauldian-informed discourse analysis (FDA) to the 
discourse produced by forty-five therapeutic practitioners who were asked to complete 
a ‘story-stem’, online.  
As will be seen in greater detail in the methodology section, ‘story completion’ is a 
novel technique for collecting qualitative data in the form of stories (Clarke, Hayfield, 
Moller & Tischner, 2017). Instead of being asked to report directly on their 
understandings of a phenomenon, in story-completion research, participants are 
provided with the opening sentences of a story about a hypothetical scenario (the ‘story 
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stem’ or ‘cue’) and asked to complete it. Story completion ideally suits topics that are 
thought to be ‘sensitive’ and which participants struggle or hesitate to talk about. That 
is because they are asked to respond to a hypothetical scenario, so they don’t have to 
‘own’ or justify their stories in the way they would if they were asked directly about 
the topic in an interview situation (Braun et al., 2018). 
Researchers in previous studies that aimed to explore shame noticed that it can be 
difficult for participants to name their shame experiences and talk openly about them. 
In particular, Miller and Draghi-Lorenz (2005) mentioned that, due to the “inevitably 
social nature of the interviews”, participants’ descriptions in their study seemed to 
reflect the “less threatening end of the spectrum of possible shame experiences” (p. 
17). In a similar vein, it has been suggested that “shame tends to evoke shame” both 
in research and clinical practice (Livingston & Farber, 1996, p. 608; Macdonald & 
Morley, 2001). Indeed, in their study, Livingston and Farber (1996) argued that 
therapists – especially those with less clinical experience – may find it difficult to talk 
about intense feelings created by shame in a research situation. For these reasons, 
Macdonald and Morley (2001) suggested that, in order to develop a theoretical 
understanding of phenomena such as emotions, researchers need to use methods which 
“can encompass unforeseen factors that might otherwise be obscured by the 
researchers’ a priori constructs” (p. 3). In accordance with Henwood and Pidgeon’s 
(1996) criteria for qualitative research, they also emphasised the need to use methods 
that are “inclusive and context-sensitive” (p. 2) when we examine shame. Based on 
these observations, it was thought that a method that would allow participants to not 
talk about their personal experiences or views on shame would be more appropriate 
for exploring the ways it is constructed in their accounts. 
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2. SHAME IN REVIEW 
 
As discussed earlier, accounts of shame within the literature come from a variety of 
epistemological and theoretical perspectives, which hold different assumptions in 
relation to therapeutic work. In this chapter, I aim explore the multiple constructions 
of shame and problematise them within the context of counselling psychology and 
psychotherapy. Before that though, I will offer a brief overview of the social 
constructionist position in relation to emotions and shame in order to outline the basic 
assumptions about emotional life that underpin this thesis. A more detailed description 
of my epistemological position is offered in the methodology section, so it should be 
noted that it is not my intention to provide a thorough discussion of social 
constructionism here.  
In line with Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine’s (2008) suggestions about the structure of 
Foucauldian informed research, I then offer a brief genealogy of shame. In this section, 
I aim to demonstrate the multiple ways that shame has been constructed in different 
sociocultural contexts and examine the historical links between truth, knowledge and 
power (Schirato, Danaher & Jen, 2012). 
 
2.1. Social Construction of Emotions and Shame 
‘Emotion’ is a term that is widely used in a variety of theories to cover phenomena 
such as shame, guilt, anger and other affective states (Taylor, 1985). However, the 
literature that pertains to emotions is vast and comes from different disciplines and 
approaches. Theories coming from the social constructionist framework share the 
principle that emotions are “socioculturally-constituted” (Armon-Jones, 1986, p. 32).  
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The principle of ‘sociocultural constitution’ is part of a general theory about the social 
construction of individual experience, which originated in the post-Enlightenment 
philosophy (Mead, 1934). According to this theory, individual experiences and 
behaviours can only be understood in terms of the behaviour of the whole group. 
Indeed, most social constructionist traditions presume that we have no access to 
experience or any kind of objective reality beyond language (Rorty, 1989). Within this 
framework meaning and understanding are seen as “property of social relationships” 
and thus, it is not possible to have knowledge of phenomena in themselves (Pattison, 
2000, p. 31).  
According to social constructionists, emotional experiences are understandings 
derived from the beliefs, social rules and, importantly, the language of the agent’s 
cultural community (Harre, 1986). They are characterised by judgements and desires 
which are not ‘natural’ but determined by the local values and moral beliefs. Hence, 
the capacity to experience any emotion, including shame, involves cultural knowledge 
and our learning to interpret and appraise matters in terms of norms that are judged as 
desirable or appropriate to the context (Pritchard, 1976).  
This account differs from naturalistic conceptualisations of emotions in a variety of 
ways. First, instead of approaching them as automatic reactions elicited from the 
natural features which a situation may possess, it positions them as socioculturally 
determined responses which are acquired and featured in specific situations (Armon-
Jones, 1986). This is not simply to say that culture provides understandings which 
`trigger' biologically determined responses (Gilbert, 1997). Instead, within wider 
sociocultural systems of meaning we learn not just what to become emotional about, 
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but also when, to what extent and what kinds of emotional experience are possible and 
appropriate to the context (Parkinson, 1996). 
Secondly, emotional responses are seen to have a ‘function’ and an ‘action tendency’ 
(Averill, 1980). Emotions, are ‘functional’ in that they are prescribed in such a way as 
to sustain and endorse cultural systems of belief and regulate socially undesirable 
behaviour. Shame, for example, is widely known as a ‘moral emotion’ (Pattison, 
2000), whose function is to divert the person from inappropriate desires, behaviours 
or supress other “sinful” (Armon-Jones, 1986, p. 71) emotions. Along with other 
‘social’ emotions, shame helps to define social norms or behaviours and signals the 
state of social bonds (Scheff, 1990). As will be seen below, throughout history, shame 
could be seen as an indispensable part of the socio-emotional architecture and it is 
arguably being used for purposes of power and control by institutions. Further, it has 
been contended that emotions are used to assign causes and motives to actions, 
blamings or excuses (Edwards, 1999).  
Within the same framework, Sarbin (1986) conceptualised emotions as ‘performances’ 
that act as signals or sources of information to the self and others. According to this 
theory, emotional expression follows social rules that are learned in the same way that 
actors acquire the feelings, words and gestures that go along with a theatrical role. 
Emotional interactions are therefore part of a “social drama”, whilst individual 
behaviours are seen as “performances enacted in particular social and linguistic 
contexts” (Sarbin, 1986, p. 86). This implies that individuals, along with the emotions 
they display, cannot be understood outside their context. 
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2.1.1. Implications of the Social Constructionist Account  
An understanding of emotions as socially constructed categories with prescribed 
contextual functions has several theoretical and practical implications. Although social 
constructionism accepts oppositional theories as valid discourses, it argues against 
traditional views expressed in naturalist accounts which theorise emotions as 
‘passions’ or intrapsychic, non-purposive forces, that serve to disrupt rationality 
(Edwards, 1999; Morrison, 2011). It also goes beyond Cartesian and Darwinian 
theories that understood emotions as purposive in so far as they assist the individual’s 
survival (Harre, 1986). From a social constructionist perspective these theories detach 
emotions from their context and construct them as individual, physiological states. As 
such, they ignore the contribution of the wider sociocultural system in the appraisal 
and expression of various emotional states. From an ontological point of view, this 
detachability is traced in the status assigned to detachable substantives as mind, soul 
and psyche, which is present in various psychotherapeutic traditions that locate 
emotion in the bodily container (Sarbin, 1986).  
Moreover, as will be seen below, in many contemporary theories, including 
psychoanalysis or behaviourism, emotions are seen as ‘drives’, or reactions to stimuli, 
connected to our animal heritage that ‘happen’ (Pattison, 2000). In opposition to that 
view, emotions from the social constructionist viewpoint are seen as acts with specific 
functions. These functions can be traced within the wider sociocultural system and 
examined through language.  
Ultimately, constructing emotions as part of a “social drama”, as mentioned above, 
presumes that “getting in touch with one’s feelings is not so much a process of 
discovery, as it is an act of creation” (Averill, 1986, p. 105). Thus, emotions are 
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conceptualised as dynamic parts of a wider institutional context and individuals as 
active agents, rather than passive “victims” of their passions (Sarbin, 1986, p. 83). 
2.1.2. Approaching Shame through a Social Constructionist Lens 
Based on the theories described above, in this thesis, I aim to examine the ways that 
the emotion of ‘shame’ is constructed in the context of therapy. In particular, I aim to 
understand the ‘social script’ of therapy and the roles or ‘positions’ that become 
available for the therapist and the client, in relation to shame. In accordance with the 
social constructionist position, with its emphasis on language as the main vehicle for 
examining sociocultural systems (Burr, 2003), I will explore how shame is ‘storied’ 
by therapists and the ways they construct their ‘role’, in relation to that of a client who 
experiences shame in a set scenario. 
As described earlier, from a social constructionist viewpoint, experiences of shame are 
seen as culturally constructed and therefore varied. Therefore, what I am referring to 
as ‘shame’ is understood as a set of phenomena which are part of a social script and 
share a set of common appraisals, behaviours and bodily sensations across a variety of 
cultural systems (Averill, 1998). Although shame is understood as a ‘social construct’, 
rather than an involuntary, internalised ‘force’, it should be noted that I am not 
assuming that it should necessarily be taken to be voluntary and intentional. Rather, 
shame can be a painful experience, involving a strong sense of being trapped and 
powerless (Nathanson, 1992).  
Having provided an overview of the basic assumptions that underpin this thesis, in the 
next section I provide a brief genealogical account of the concept of shame, in order 
to elucidate the discursive shifts that have been implicated in its construction.  
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2.2. A Genealogical Account of Shame 
As mentioned in the previous sections, in mainstream psychological literature as well 
as in empirical studies, shame is mostly conceptualised as part of several psychological 
disorders, with some theories describing it as “the dominant negative affect” or part of 
‘self-conscious emotions’ (Tangney, 1992; Tomkins, 1963, p. 140). However, this has 
not always been the case, as throughout the ages, it has been constructed in different 
ways, that are dependent on the sociocultural context in which it is being considered. 
In this section, I aim to demonstrate these discursive shifts, in order to relativise and 
contextualise the contemporary psychological discourses (Arribas-Ayllon & 
Walkerdine, 2008). I also aim to emphasise the role that the social context might play 
in our ways of conceptualising certain phenomena, including emotions and thus, argue 
for an understanding of shame as a social construct. As will be seen below, the 
conceptualisation of shame as a self-conscious emotion is a rather recent phenomenon, 
mainly related to the social construction of the self in the West. Far from the 
descriptions of the ‘negative’ affect, shame has historically been characterised as a 
positive or even desired state, providing a powerful tool for social conformity as well 
as a reflection of social relationships (Pattison, 2000). 
2.2.1. Shame in Collectivist Societies 
Early written records suggest that shame was pervasive in premodern societies and 
was mainly used as a tool to enforce social discipline and enhance the pre-existing 
hierarchy (Stearns, 2017). It should be noted that these societies were considered 
‘collectivist’ and were characterised by an emphasis on cohesiveness among 
individuals and prioritisation of the group over self. Relationships were based on a pre-
defined, mostly hereditary social hierarchy, so the concept of shame was closely 
23 
 
related to humility. In particular, there are references to ‘subordination shame’, which 
occurred when a ‘poor man’ had to speak with the ‘village head’ but was affected by 
his sense of inferiority, so he displayed all the standard posture and facial cues of 
shame (Geaney, 2004). Besides, there are lots of references about ‘public shaming’, 
which was seen as a legitimate practice for those who violated the social standards, 
especially in medieval years. According to anthropological references, people in these 
societies accepted the moral value of shame, despite the anxiety it provoked as it 
communicated respect and appeasement, which enabled activities within the accepted 
social structure. In fact, members of the community who did not show appropriate 
levels of shame were seen as unreliable and unpredictable (Fessler, 2004).  
In contrast to our current ways of understanding it, shame in these cultures seemed to 
be a necessary and rather positive affect, which played a major role in the formation 
and coherence of premodern, collectivist societies. In order to avoid the unpleasant 
experience of private or public shame, individuals had to adjust various aspects of their 
life according to the given moral, aesthetic or political norms. It also contributed to the 
maintenance of a stable social structure and made the power dynamics more visible by 
forcing a system of fixed relations (Stearns, 2017). However, it appears that the more 
societies headed towards modernity, the more they began to be characterised by 
individualism, so there was a tendency towards a highly coordinated, independent 
social order that was controlled by internal, personal control, rather than external 
forces, such as public shaming. Therefore, people were directly or indirectly 
encouraged to monitor and control their own affects (Foucault, 1979; Pattison, 2000).  
2.2.2. The Effects of Enlightenment Thought in our Current Understanding of Shame 
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According to historical and anthropological references, modernity and urbanisation 
brought changes in the ways that emotions, including shame were talked about 
(Stearns, 2017). In particular, shame ceased to be understood as ‘shame’ about 
something, such as a violation of a social standard, as in collectivist societies. Rather, 
it started being approached as “property of the individual”, which exists independently 
of its context (Leeming & Boyle, 2004, p. 3). Many theorists (e.g. Foucault, 1972; 
Gergen, 1994; Stearns, 2017), have attributed this switch to the creation of 
‘institutions’ in modern societies, which in turn played a significant role in the 
maintenance of social structure. Indeed, societies stopped relying on procedures such 
as public shaming. Besides, individualism and individual ‘dignity’ started to become 
more important values, compared to the hierarchy and honour of collectivist cultures 
(Stearns, 2017). Importantly, the Enlightenment brought a new understanding of the 
individual who was no longer defined by their ‘sins’, as in medieval societies. Rather, 
people started being understood as able to improve and change through rational 
education and have key rights such as freedom of religion and of expression (Gergen 
1994). Therefore, shame, which was historically related to a sense of ‘wrongdoing’ 
started being understood as a private matter, with individuals, rather than societies 
being responsible for changing their behaviour (Stearns, 2017).  
Philosophers like Descartes introduced the concept of the ‘rational being’, who is 
capable and, thus needs to resist their emotions and bodily ‘passions’ by using rational 
thought. Descartes suggested that emotions must be harnessed in order to learn which 
are good and bad for the body, and therefore for the individual’s survival (Brown & De 
Sousa, 2003). These theories could be seen as enhancing our understanding of shame 
as attributed to inner processes and conceptualised as part of a personality structure, 
rather than public disgrace, as in collectivist cultures. Apart from that, the lack of a 
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pre-defined, hereditary social status in modern and postmodern societies moved the 
locus of evaluation from an external moral order to a sense of individual, internalised 
shame (Stearns, 2017). Paradoxically, the postmodern self is self-observing but at the 
same time acutely aware of the observation and opinions of others (Giddens, 1991). 
Indeed, shame can only be understood in relation to others, as, compared to other 
emotions, it is never fully located within the individual. 
Overall, it has been argued that our current understandings of emotions in the context 
of therapy are largely based on the concept of a core, private self, which is a product 
of individualistic societies and Enlightenment thought (Gergen, 1994; Guigon, 2004). 
Theorists have also suggested that, historically, the modern concept of ‘rationality’, 
along with the lack of an externally imposed social structure made it more likely for 
individuals to search their identities in more ‘scientific’ ways. This, in turn, led to an 
increased interest in psychological theories and psychoanalysis, as a way to understand 
someone’s ‘real’, self (Richards, 2002). As is further discussed in the analysis section, 
shame is inextricably linked to the concept of the modern, individual self, although 
this makes it highly problematic, as its ‘private’ nature prevents the exploration of 
one’s ‘authentic’ self, which seems to be the purpose of most therapies.  
In sum, in this section, I aimed to elucidate that the way we understand shame has, to 
a great extent, shifted through the years. In particular, what is considered a taken-for-
granted assumption in our approach to dealing with it in the therapy room has been 
influenced by the sociohistorical context within which it is being considered 
(McNamee, 1996). Having contextualised psychological understandings of shame, in 
the next section, I offer an overview of the literature and the empirical studies coming 
from the three major schools of psychotherapy. This section aims to map out the 
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different discourses within the broader therapeutic theories. It should be noted that a 
comprehensive account of the literature in relation to shame is beyond the scope of 
this review. Instead, my goal is to demonstrate the differences in the assumptions that 
different schools of thought hold in relation to the management of shame in the therapy 
room. The selection of the theories reviewed in this section was based on their 
relevance with counselling psychology practice in relation to shame. In accordance 
with the epistemological framework of the study, the empirical research is critically 
reviewed from a social constructionist perspective. 
 
2.3. Psychological Understandings of Shame and Counselling Psychology  
Counselling psychology as a scientific field is known for its commitment to diversity 
and pluralism, rather than schoolism (Milton, 2010). Its practitioners seek to develop 
models of practice that value the therapeutic relationship along with the language-
based interactive processes inherent in it, emphasise the sociocultural context and aim 
to “empower rather than control” (BPS, 2017a, p. 2). Therefore, as part of a 
counselling psychology research work, it is imperative to critically evaluate the 
different understandings of shame and examine where they stand in relation to the 
division’s aims and philosophies (BPS, 2017a). Despite the emphasis on humanistic 
values, mainstream counselling psychology handbooks (i.e. Milton, 2010; Strawbridge 
& Woolfe, 2010) encourage their practitioners to practice in a flexible way and “draw 
on all the appropriate and useful material available in the range of psychological 
approaches” (Milton, 2010, p. 103). Thus, in this section, I offer an overview of the 
clinical and empirical literature from the cognitive-behavioural, psychodynamic and 
humanistic/existential frameworks. These three psychological approaches are 
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discussed in most counselling psychology textbooks (e.g. Galbraith, 2017; Milton, 
2010) and are part of the teaching curricula in the majority of training courses, which 
is why they were selected for the review. 
Overall, despite several common assumptions about the nature of emotions and the 
role of the therapist, in most theories, there are significant differences. Underpinned 
by a social constructionist framework, I will outline the broad themes within each 
paradigm. As the study of shame is a rather broad area, for clarity purposes, I have 
narrowed my focus on shame and its impact on the therapeutic process as it is 
understood and examined within the theoretical and empirical literature arising from 
different psychological theories. Although the papers included in the review were 
checked against the qualitative criteria for their validity and credibility (Henwood & 
Pidgeon, 1992), most of my critique is focussed on the epistemologies they are 
drawing upon. This decision was made mainly for coherence purposes, as my aim is 
to contextualise this study and demonstrate paradigms’ neglect of the constitutive role 
of language and the power struggles that take place in the therapeutic process. 
2.3.1. Cognitive-Behavioural Understandings 
Within the cognitive behavioural discourse, shame is conceptualised as a set of 
negative core beliefs that impact the individual’s behaviours and physiological 
responses (e.g. blushing or having aggressive outbursts) (Bosson & Prewitt-Freilino, 
2007). Theories coming from this perspective differentiate between ‘normal’ levels of 
shame, which can promote healthy social and moral development and chronic, intense 
levels, which have been associated with various psychological disorders, including 
depression (Cheung, Gilbert & Irons, 2004), posttraumatic stress disorder (Dyer et al., 
2009), anxiety (Harder, Cutler & Rockert, 1992) and self-harming behaviour (Gilbert 
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et al., 2010). Cognitive theories suggest that shame is triggered by a cognitive-
evaluative process through which the self is appraised as ‘undesirable’ or ‘bad’ (Mills, 
2005). Furthermore, critical and/or aversive life experiences can instil negative core 
beliefs about the self which then present as shame-related cognitive biases, emotional 
states and behaviours (Bosson & Prewitt-Freilino, 2007). Within this framework, the 
cognitive-attribution model has received the most empirical attention. It has been 
suggested that attributions that are negative, stable and internal are key to the creation 
and maintenance of shame (Black, Curran & Dyer, 2013). In particular, individuals 
who attribute their poor performance to internal, stable and uncontrollable factors are 
more likely to feel shame than those who do not make such attributions (Tracey & 
Robins, 2007). 
With regard to shame within the therapeutic process, studies coming from this 
perspective have linked shame-related behaviours with non-compliance and ruptures 
in the therapeutic process. Specifically, Black, Curran and Dyer (2013) found certain 
shame-coping strategies to be linked with poor therapeutic outcomes, whilst shamed 
individuals were less likely to form satisfactory therapeutic alliances. In a similar vein, 
in two other studies (Hook & Andrews, 2005; Swan & Andrews, 2003) shame was 
associated with poorer engagement, lack of self-disclosure and increased risk within 
the therapeutic process. A more recent study examined the role of shame in therapeutic 
work with clients with narcissistic personality disorder. They argued that it can play a 
central role in the process and outcomes of therapy and emphasised the central role of 
‘self-compassion’ as a way of dealing with it and reducing symptom intensity in the 
course of treatment (Kramer, Pascual-Leone, Rohde & Sachse, 2018). 
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These studies confirm that shame can have a significant impact on therapy and thus, 
needs further attention in terms of the ways it manifests and impacts the therapeutic 
work. Nevertheless, the cognitive theory draws heavily on a positivist discourse which 
is historically influenced by the modern, Cartesian notions of ‘rational thinking’, as 
described in the previous section. Indeed, it could be argued that cognitive behaviour 
therapy endorses an understanding of shame as a knowable and treatable condition, 
rather than an emotion to be understood within its context.  
2.3.3. Psychodynamic Understandings 
Most theories within the psychodynamic framework conceptualise shame as a product 
of unconscious intrapsychic processes (Pattison, 2000). In his structural model, Freud 
referred to it as part of the super-ego that aims to inhibit the drives of the libido, 
particularly with regard to sexually related instincts (Freud, 1923). Later, Erikson 
(Erikson, 1965) furthered Freud’s understanding and suggested that infants pass 
through the early developmental stage of ‘autonomy versus shame’ before they 
advance to the stage of ‘initiative versus guilt’. However, adult shame was understood 
more as anger turned against the self.  
Contemporary psychodynamic theorists have linked shame with ‘narcissism’. 
Morrison (1983), for example, constructed it as an emotion related to self-critical 
judgements and “failures of the ideal self” (p. 296). In his later writings, he described 
it as an intense sense of “deficit” or “fragmentation”, which exposes individuals to 
narcissistic vulnerability. Moreover, he emphasised the idea that shame is about the 
whole self, rather than a particular behaviour, compared to guilt or other emotions. He 
argued that the reference to the whole self is what makes the experience of shame so 
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intense and prevents individuals from acting in ‘reparative’ ways (Morrison, 2011, p. 
25). 
The research investigating shame from a psychoanalytic perspective is very limited 
and consists of a handful of case studies and self-reports. For example, Livingston 
(2006) described her own experience as a group analyst and suggested that as a result 
of clients’ projections, therapists may experience a sense of inadequacy or hostility 
when working with clients’ shame. She also suggested that if they do not pay enough 
attention in relation to these processes, they might lose their therapeutic stance and 
attempt to ‘fix’ rather than understand their client’s experience. In a similar vein, 
Retzinger (1998) traced the thread of therapists’ shame in the analysis of therapy 
transcripts. He discussed the potential ‘hazards’ of shame, outside a therapist’s 
awareness and suggested that a therapist’s shame countertransference can be used to 
monitor the state of the therapeutic bond.  
Psychodynamic discourses could be seen as constructing a version of reality, whereby 
the therapist is impacted through a relational process, which seems relevant to the 
counselling psychology relational values (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010). However, it 
could be argued that within this framework, both the role of language and the 
sociocultural context that shame is taking place in are rather disregarded in favour of 
the intrapsychic and developmental processes. In particular, in the studies described 
above (Livingston, 2006; Retzinger, 1998) therapists understand what is happening in 
the session in terms of ‘projections’ or ‘countertransference reactions’ between the 
therapist and the client. Within these processes, language could be seen as descriptive 
rather than constructive and the power struggles that take place in the session are rather 
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concealed. Overall, shame within this framework is seen as a pre-existing condition, 
rather than a product of a particular social encounter. 
2.3.3. Humanistic and Phenomenological Understandings 
Although it is recognised that humanistic and phenomenological approaches hold 
different theoretical assumptions with regard to therapeutic practice and the concept 
of ‘self’ (Spinelli, 1994), there are several overlaps in the ways they understand the 
therapist’s role, which is why I am referring to them in the same section. Both of them 
could be seen as being based on an attitude of ‘being with’ rather than ‘doing to’ the 
client (Rogers, 1957; Spinelli, 2006). Moreover, they embrace a non-directive stance, 
whereby the therapist aims to refrain “from intruding his own wishes, his own 
reactions, or biases into the therapeutic situations” (Rogers, 1942, p. 88). In humanistic 
therapies, the client’s problems could be seen as revealing an underlying experience 
of incongruence and the therapist aims to enable them to be ‘true’ to themselves 
(Spinelli, 1994). Although there are no direct references to shame coming from this 
perspective, it might be argued that shame stems from one’s difficulty to be congruent 
to oneself and/or others.  
Existential philosophers like Sartre or Nietzsche have written about shame in their 
work. Sartre in particular, understood shame as a failure to meet others’ standards and 
values, whilst the idea of judging oneself negatively as degraded through the eyes of 
the ‘Other’ was common in his writings (e.g. Sartre, 1958). Further, in many of 
Nietzsche’s writings, shame was seen as a captivating force for individuals from which 
they need deliverance (Nietzsche, 1974). In these accounts, shame was conceptualised 
as a moral emotion related to a sense of dishonour and inferiority that prevents human 
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beings from attaining their true potential and attending the standards of the ‘super-
human’ (Taylor, 1985).  
In regard to shame within the therapeutic process, there are a number of 
phenomenological studies that have examined the ways it is experienced by both 
clients and therapists. Specifically, Miller and Draghi-Lorenz (2005) examined 
therapists’ experiences of their shame being activated during their client work. In this 
study, shame was described as an “elephant in the consulting room” by participants (p. 
11), whilst they reported a sense of finding shame-related cues “too hot to touch” and 
as a result, having an urge to return to a “safe mode” and avoid discussing or 
approaching these moments (p. 15). Participants also talked about a sense of 
disconnection from their client, which led to feelings of incompetence and self-doubt. 
Interestingly, researchers reflected on their sense that participants avoided talking 
about shame experiences in an open and transparent way. It was argued that they had 
a tendency to talk about “the least threatening experiences and hide the most shaming 
ones” (p. 17). Finally, it was acknowledged that training is a period when therapists 
are more susceptible to experiencing shame (Miller & Draghi-Lorenz, 2005), yet 
“lacking in safe places” (p. 17) to talk about it and process it. A sense of incompetency 
and the urge to disconnect were common themes in another phenomenological study 
that examined therapists’ experiences of dealing with their clients’ shame (Petter, 
2010). In this research, shame was described as “an electric current in the room” (p. 
171) whilst some of the participants felt overwhelmed and “unable to hold it or talk 
about it” (p. 177-178). The researcher emphasised the importance of therapists 
working both “intra- and inter-subjectively”, in order to better understand the impact 
of shame both on the client and the practitioner.  
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These studies provide some information of the phenomenology of shame and the ways 
it can impact therapeutic practice. The ‘richness’ of their data could be seen as 
highlighting the suitability of qualitative research as a way of researching shame. 
However, participants’ difficulty in talking openly about the most shameful 
experiences raises questions about how they would talk and what language they would 
use if they had to do so. Furthermore, it could be argued that the emphasis of these 
studies on the individual experience and subjectivity enhances the concept of the self-
conscious, modern self, as described in the previous section. In particular, shame is 
constructed as an individual, subjective-or in some studies ‘intersubjective’ 
experience-without sufficient attention being given to the context in which these 
experiences are taking place and the impact it may have on the ways participants talk 
about shame. For example, the assumptions about the role of the therapist and the 
expectations from the client could be seen as taken-for-granted in the above studies. 
Finally, the potential power struggles and their implications on the therapeutic process 
are rather neglected within the phenomenological framework.  
 
2.4. Summary and Aims of Current Research  
In this review, I traced the understandings of shame in different contexts throughout 
history. Shame discourses were arguably mutable and multiply constructed. In 
particular, there seemed to be a negotiation between the construction of shame as an 
individual-private experience in most therapeutic discourses and a ‘public’ socially 
embedded emotion in sociohistorical accounts. Within the therapeutic discourses, 
there seemed to be great variations in the ways shame was constructed. For example, 
within the cognitive-behavioural paradigm, it was understood as part of the clients’ 
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distorted thinking or psychopathology, belonging solely to them (Bosson & Prewitt-
Freilino, 2007). Phenomenological perspectives, on the other hand, paid more 
attention to the ways that therapists may prolong or exacerbate clients’ shame with 
their stance (e.g. Petter, 2010). It is argued that the variety of theoretical 
understandings of shame can impact how a client might be attended to when seeking 
support. Indeed, within the discursive framework, it is assumed that the ways a 
phenomenon is ‘discoursed’, can have implications for how it is dealt with in the 
therapeutic practice (Willig, 2008). 
Having provided an overview of some of the discourses available to therapeutic 
practitioners, in the next chapters, I aim to examine the different ways they construct 
shame in the context of therapy and their implications for subjectivity and practice. In 
accordance with a Foucauldian perspective, the purpose of this inquiry is to understand 
how these discourses limit, enable or constrain what can be said by therapists and 
clients in relation to shame (Parker, 1992). 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The aim of the study is to explore how therapeutic practitioners construct shame within 
the therapeutic context. As will be seen in the next sections, the analysis has been 
structured around the following sub-questions:  
• What are the sociocultural discourses imbricated when constructing shame?  
• How is the therapist positioned in relation to shame in participants’ stories?  
• What are the implications for therapeutic practice? 
In this chapter, I offer an overview of the methodology and the relevant methods I 
employ, as well as the rationale for their use in this study.  
 
3.1. Rationale for a Qualitative, Discursive Study 
The literature review indicated a paucity of research which considers shame within the 
context of therapy. It was argued that in mainstream empirical literature, shame is 
understood as a “context free, intrapsychic variable” (Leeming & Boyle, 2004, p. 1). 
In particular, most empirical studies have not paid sufficient attention to the 
constitutive role of language and the power struggles that take place in the therapy 
room. Moreover, most of the existing research almost fails to take into account the 
ways that the dominant therapeutic values might be impacting how shame is 
understood by therapists. Based on these gaps, it was thought that a qualitative 
approach would allow me to attend to these issues.  
As discussed earlier, shame has been approached from a variety of perspectives, which 
hold different, and often oppositional assumptions about how it can be dealt with in 
the therapy room. Stemming from social constructionism, discursive approaches 
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embrace the multiplicity of interrelated and often conflicting conceptualisations and 
reject the idea of a universal truth (Burr, 2003). In particular, by analysing the 
processes through which different constructions of a phenomenon are communicated 
as ‘facts’, they aim to deconstruct taken-for-granted assumptions adopted by 
essentialist conceptualisations and examine their impact on different contexts (Burr, 
2003; Willig, 2008).  
By employing a qualitative, discursive approach in this study, I aim to problematise 
(Arribas-Aylon & Walkerdine, 2008) the dominant psychological theories. It is 
suggested that these theories provide a useful way to approach shame, but when they 
are taken-for-granted they can limit our perspective (Avdi & Georgaka, 2007). 
Discourse analysis provides a way to question mainstream theories, as it focuses on 
the processes by which claims are communicated as facts and thereby empowered as 
“truth” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 20).  
 
3.2. Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
Within the discursive framework, there are different ways of analysing language 
material. Discursive psychology and FDA2 are considered the two major forms of 
discourse analysis within psychology (Willig, 2008), although theorists have identified 
at least six different forms (Wetherell, 2001). All discourse analytical approaches 
focus on language practices, even though most researchers argue that each one of them 
answers different questions and analyses different material (e.g. Parker, 1997; Potter, 
1997). In this study, I am employing the theory and methods of FDA as an analytic 
 
2 Please note that with the terms Foucauldian Discourse Analysis or ‘FDA’ I am referring to a Foucauldian 
‘informed’ discourse analysis, rather than an analysis in a typical Foucauldian sense, as he never created an 
analysis. 
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method concerned with the availability of discursive resources within a culture and its 
impact on those who live within it (Foucault, 1982; Willig, 2008). In this section, I 
offer an overview of the theoretical and epistemological assumptions of FDA, before 
I explain the methods employed in this study and the rationale behind their use.  
FDA is based on poststructuralist ideas and mainly the work of Michel Foucault. 
Influenced by these theories, a group of psychologists in the 1970s started to examine 
the relationship between language and subjectivity and its implications for 
psychological research. This led to the publication of ‘Changing the Subject’ 
(Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn & Walkerdine, 1984) which had a significant 
impact on postmodern psychology and was seen as a response to the general 
dissatisfaction with individualism, Cartesianism and positivism. ‘Changing the 
Subject’ provided a critical exploration of various mainstream psychological theories 
and their role in constructing the objects and subjects they claimed to explain. Apart 
from the influence in postmodern psychological thought, that text provided a clear 
demonstration of how poststructuralist theories could be applied to qualitative research 
(Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008; Parker, 1992; Willig, 2008). 
In contemporary psychological studies, FDA is a widely used method for examining 
the constructive role of language (Willig, 2008). It is used to explore the socio-political 
influences and the processes through which power is exercised and individuals are 
made subjects. The term ‘discourse’ in this framework refers to “a corpus of statements 
whose organisation is relatively regular and systematic” (Arribas-Ayllon & 
Walkerdine, 2008, p. 100). Discourses reflect the variety of discursive practices and 
pinpoint their transformation over time and across different institutional spaces. For 
this reason, the analysis of discourse requires a historical inquiry, known as 
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‘genealogy’. Furthermore, the analysis aims to attend to mechanisms of power and 
offers a description of the discursive functions of a particular discourse in different 
contexts (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008). Discourses offer “subject positions”, 
which, when taken up, have implications for subjectivity and experience. In the 
biomedical discourse for example, people who experience ill health occupy the subject 
position of “the patient”, which “positions them” (p. 113) as passive recipients of 
expert care within a trajectory of recovery. The term ‘positioning’ in FDA refers to the 
available ways of being and seeing the world and is strongly related to the exercise of 
power (Willig, 2008). 
It is worth mentioning that although Foucault developed an approach to discourse 
analysis, he did not prescribe a set of rules for conducting it. On the contrary, he was 
opposed to the idea of a formalised, prescriptive method and stated, “I take care not to 
dictate how things should be” (Foucault, 1994, p. 288). Despite the criticism he later 
received for not offering a concrete method (Harwood, 2000) Foucault remained 
committed to the postmodern ideological premise that there is no universal truth to be 
discovered nor a certain method for unravelling the discovery of such ‘truth’. In an 
effort to outline why FDA is of interest to psychologists, contemporary theorists have 
stipulated certain sets of procedures for conducting this type of research (e.g. Arribas-
Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008; Parker, 1992; Willig, 2008). This study was informed by 
Willig’s six steps of analysis, which I am describing in the methods section (Willig, 
2008). 
Given the lack of attention on the social context in which shame is examined, it was 
thought that FDA would provide the most appropriate way to approach it. Within a 
discourse analytic framework, therapeutic practice is thought to be part of a wider 
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system of meanings and thus, what is happening in the therapy room can only be 
understood within a specific institutional framework (McNamee, 1996). Thus, a 
macro-level analysis was deemed the most suitable way to map out the therapeutic 
discourses which participants draw upon when constructing shame and to explore the 
subjectivities that become available (Willig, 2008).  
In terms of methodological reflexivity, it should be noted that initially, I considered 
other forms of analysis, such as discursive psychology or conversation analysis 
(Wetherell, 1998), as a way to combine aspects of different analytical approaches, as 
suggested by Wetherell (2001). However, upon discussion in supervision and further 
reading it was thought that the emphasis of these approaches on interpersonal 
interaction (Wetherell, 1998) is rather incompatible with story-completion tasks, as 
participants would not be asked to interact in any way. Instead, the focus of FDA on 
the implications for subjectivity and practice makes it more compatible with my 
research questions.  
 
3.3. Rationale for a Social Constructionist Study within the Counselling 
Psychology Framework 
As described in the previous sections, within a discursive framework, language is seen 
as constructive, rather than descriptive of social realities. Most forms of macro-level 
discourse analysis, including FDA, adhere to a social constructionist epistemology. 
Within the next section, I outline the core assumptions of this approach to research. I 
also aim to highlight how this approach is relevant to the study of shame within the 
counselling psychology framework. 
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As pointed out earlier, the study of shame is characterised by a great variety of 
approaches and insights. The plurality and diversity of discourses around it suggest 
that it maybe be more relevant to adopt an epistemology that would allow me, as a 
researcher, to take all of them ‘seriously’, as important languages about shame, without 
having to make a judgement about which one is the most appropriate. Social 
constructionism is an epistemological stance that typically opposes realism (Burr, 
2003) and problematises the idea of an ultimate and objective truth. Hence, social 
constructionist research aims to problematise realist assumptions. From this 
perspective, knowledge is understood as historically and culturally specific and thus, 
people are seen as inseparable from the historical and cultural discourses (Burr, 2003). 
It is suggested that a critical approach to therapeutic knowledges and power relations 
around shame is of significance to counselling psychology as the Health Care 
Professional Standards Commission (HCPC, 2016) stipulates that all practitioners 
must be attentive to the power imbalances between clients and practitioners and 
question oppressive practices. Except for that, from a social constructionist 
perspective, language plays a vital role in constructing realities and is seen as much 
more than a communication tool that describes reality. In particular, language is 
understood as “the primary arena for action, understanding and intersubjectivity”, 
whilst its role is to construct rather than represent realities (Wiggins & Potter, 2008, p. 
73). This approach is consistent with counselling psychology philosophy that sees 
language as “the primary constituent of 'reality'” (Spinelli, 2001, p. 6) and therapy as 
the medium for the construction of meaning and truth about clients' experiences 
(Guterman, 1996). Therefore, it was thought that a social constructionist study of 
language use could provide an insight into how language is utilised to construct various 
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meanings of shame within the therapeutic context and offer a purposeful move away 
from positivist truth claims. 
 
3.4. Ontological Assumptions 
Within the discursive framework, there is an on-going debate between theorists who 
support a relativist approach (e.g. Edwards, Ashmore & Potter, 1995) and those who 
argue for a more moderate, critical realist position (Parker, 1992). Both relativists and 
critical realists consider language as central to our understanding of the world. 
However, critical realists contend that “discourse analysts need to attend to the 
conditions which make the meanings of texts possible” (Parker, 1992, p. 28). On the 
other hand, relativists do not recognise “a bottom line, a bedrock of reality that places 
limits on what may be treated as epistemologically constructed or deconstructible” (p. 
26). 
After considering both positions, I decided that a critical realist ontology was more 
accordant with the research questions and the method of analysis of this study. 
Compared to other methods of discourse analysis, that understand discourse as purely 
constructive of social realities (e.g. discursive psychology), in FDA, it is typically 
assumed that the availability of discourses is influenced by the wider institutional 
framework. From a Foucauldian perspective, it is recognised that discursive 
constructions can have ‘real’ effects on the ways that people experience the world 
(Willig, 2008), including their emotions. Although language is seen as constructive of 
social realities (Burr, 2003), this study recognises a material world that enables and/or 
constrains such constructions (Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig, 2000), in line with the 
Foucauldian theory (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008).  
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Based on these ideas, it was thought that a critical realist perspective would allow me 
to examine the ways that shame discourses are limited or shaped by ‘extra-discursive’ 
factors, such as institutional power, ideology and subjectivity (Willig, 2008). Even 
though a relativist perspective was initially considered, it was then thought that the 
emphasis of the study is on the impact of participants’ discourses on therapeutic 
practice. Therefore, an ontological position that considers a material reality outside the 
text would be more appropriate. Burr (2003) and Willig (2008) suggested that a critical 
realist perspective enables researchers to theorise why people use certain constructions 
and not others and why certain discourses become marginalised in specific contexts. 
Indeed, by focussing on the ways that power relations are played out in the therapy 
room, one could possibly reflect on how the wider institutions influence what can be 
said or done in the therapy room. 
 
3.5. Methodological Design 
In this section, I consider the specific methods used in this research. In particular, I 
discuss my method of data collection, ethical considerations and the rationale for the 
participants’ selection. I also provide an outline of analytical steps adopted and the 
rationale for their use.  
3.5.1. Data Collection; Description and Rationale for Story-Completion Method 
The purpose of this study is to explore the ways that therapists construct shame in the 
context of therapy, considering the power relations that are played out and the 
implications for therapeutic practice. As discussed in the literature review, one of the 
challenges faced by a number of researchers who examined shame in their studies has 
been the participants’ struggle to talk about it (Livingston & Farber, 1996; Miller & 
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Draghi-Lorenz, 2005). As they mentioned in their studies, this may have been a 
situational, “random” issue but could equally be related to the “inevitably social 
nature” of the interviews (Miller & Draghi-Lorenz, 2005, p. 17). Indeed, shame has 
been related to non-disclosure in both research and clinical practice (Livingston & 
Farber, 1996, p. 608; Macdonald & Morley, 2001). Although the aim of this study is 
not to make participants disclose ‘truths’ that haven’t been disclosed before, it was 
thought that story completion might bring up alternative shame discourses. It has also 
been argued that in order to get a “context-sensitive” understanding of participants’ 
accounts, researchers need to be flexible in their choice of methodologies (Macdonald 
& Morley, 2001, p. 3). Based on these suggestions it was thought that story-completion 
would provide an alternative way to examine participants’ assumptions about the 
therapeutic dynamics in relation to shame. 
Story-completion is an innovative method that was originally developed by 
psychiatrists as a projective technique to access unconscious aspects of clients’ 
personalities (Clarke et al., 2017). Later, it was used in positivist research as a way to 
better understand participants “real” thoughts and deal with “barriers of awareness and 
social desirability bias” (Kitzinger & Powell, 1995, p. 149). More recently though, it 
was suggested that instead of interpreting the stories as revealing the internal reality of 
the participants, researchers could read them through discursive lens as “reflecting 
contemporary discourses upon which subjects draw in making sense of experience” 
(Kitzinger & Powell, 1995, pp. 349– 350; Walsh & Malson, 2010). This approach to 
story-completion is accordant with a social constructionist epistemology that rejects 
the idea of ‘true’ feelings and understands realities are discursively constructed (Burr, 
2003).  
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Story-completion is thought to be a useful way of accessing participants’ assumptions 
about topics that are thought to be socially undesirable (Clarke, Braun & Wooles, 
2015), as it gives them more choice of where they want to direct their story. It has been 
argued that the concept of a hypothetical scenario, can give them more flexibility than 
other methods. For example, the ambiguity of some story stems (please see ‘story 
stem’ below), means that participants are given the space to choose the direction and 
style of their story, being “the sole authority of what and how they write” (Clarke et 
al., 2017, p. 50).  
Thus, in the context of this study, it was thought that the ambiguity of the story stem 
would give participants the chance to construct the process of therapy, the characters 
and their emotions in a more creative and less restrictive way. Based on the reflections 
of researchers who have previously used this method (e.g. Braun et al., 2019; Clarke, 
Braun & Wooles, 2015), I assumed that the fact that participants do not have to refer 
to themselves in relation to shame, would give them the chance to think of shame more 
broadly. Due to the third person accounts of the story stem, they would not have to 
take ‘ownership’ of their responses, so they could construct alternative and possibly 
new perspectives on shame. 
3.5.2. Design  
In most studies that have used this method researchers give participants a hypothetical 
scenario (the story-stem) and ask them to complete the rest of the story. Based on 
Clarke’s (Clarke et al., 2017) suggestions, in this study, participants were given the 
following instructions: 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
“You are invited to read the following story opening carefully and complete the rest of 
the story. There is no right or wrong way to complete it, so feel free to write whatever 
comes to your mind! Please write a story that is at least 10 lines/200 words long.  
Alex has recently started working therapeutically with a new client named Jo. In their 
second session, Alex is feeling rather puzzled. Jo seems to avoid eye contact and stops 
talking at various points during the session. Then Jo discloses feeling ashamed …  
Please complete and expand on this story by describing Jo, Alex and their interaction, 
focussing on: How the session(s) unfold(s)  
What was Jo’s shame about?  
What might be going on between them?  
What was Alex’s reaction to Jo’s shame?  
What happens next?  
Your story can unfold into the next sessions and beyond. Please write your answers in 
the form of a story!” 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Based on various phenomenological descriptions, Jo is presented as displaying bodily 
signs indicative of shame including avoidance of eye contact and difficulty talking 
(Nathanson, 1992). The story was purposefully left ambiguous with regard to the 
characteristics of the therapist and the client, including their professional capacity, 
orientation, length of the therapeutic work, experience or their gender. In particular, I 
tried to give gender ambiguous names to both of them, in order to avoid ‘imposing’ any 
restrictions or set characteristics that might impact the direction of the story and the 
ways shame is constructed in relation to the characters. The character of the therapist 
was initially constructed as female, as there is a larger number of female than male 
therapists. However, after doing the first pilots and upon discussion in supervision it 
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was thought that the gender-ambiguous names would give greater freedom to 
participants and this might provide meaningful material for the analysis, in terms of the 
power relations.  
Further details on the story-completion task as well as my reflections on the use of this 
method can be found in the discussion section. 
3.5.3. Study Procedures 
Participants: Overall, there have been great variations in participant numbers in studies 
that have used story-completion. According to Clarke (Clarke et al., 2017, p. 57-58), 
a sample of 20-40 participants is likely to provide the researcher with data that are 
“detailed enough for a meaningful analysis”. Based on these suggestions and in line 
with previous studies that have used this method within a social constructionist 
framework (e.g. Gavin, 2005; Walsh & Malson, 2010), I initially decided to recruit 20 
participants. Nevertheless, I was unsure of the sizes of the stories and the quality of 
data I would get. When I reached 20 participants I did not stop recruiting, as the stories 
were much shorter than I had expected. Therefore, I felt unable analyse them, as I 
could not see any patterns at that point. Moreover, I could see new discursive themes 
emerging from the stories.  
I finally recruited 45 participants, at which point I thought my data had reached 
‘saturation’ (Morse, 2003). In particular, I could see some patterns that would allow 
me to conduct a meaningful analysis from a social constructionist perspective. 
Furthermore, after the first 42 stories, I could not see any new ideas coming up, so I 
decided to stop collecting further data. Although ‘saturation’ is a rather contested 
concept within the qualitative framework, most researchers agree that one can stop 
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collecting further data when they “do not lead to any new emergent themes” (Given, 
2016, p. 135). 
Participants were asked demographic questions relating to their age, theoretical 
orientation and professional capacity. These data were considered in order to offer a 
context to the participants’ stories and situate the sample, in accordance with the 
criterion of ‘applicability’3 (Willig, 2008). In particular, it was thought that the 
contextual influences (e.g. participants’ background and/or theoretical orientation) 
might be of significant analytical interest, so it would be worth collecting them in 
advance. However, it should be noted that in discourse analysis, the emphasis is on 
what is being told, rather than who does the telling (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), so 
detailed demographic information was not considered relevant to the study. 
Among the inclusion criteria, was self-identification as a ‘qualified therapeutic 
practitioner’, whilst the participants’ professional capacities varied. As this research is 
part of a counselling psychology doctorate, it was important for me to include 
counselling psychologists in my sample. Nevertheless, shame is a topic that could be 
relevant to anyone working therapeutically, regardless of their professional 
background and theoretical orientation, as was shown in the literature review (e.g. 
Miller & Draghi-Lorenz, 2005). Thus, I decided not to limit my participants’ 
background to psychology. Besides, in the absence of prescribed guidelines regarding 
the homogeneity of the sample for FDA, it was thought that a well-rounded selection 
of different specialities and theoretical orientations would provide a better 
understanding of the different discourses that participants draw upon when 
 
3 Please see ‘section 3.7’ below for a detailed description of the quality criteria that this research aimed to 
abide.  
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constructing shame. Compared to other approaches, sampling in discourse analysis 
seeks diversity rather than representativeness or homogeneity in order to capture the 
variations in the discourse (Mays & Pope, 2000). 
Therefore, the final sample consisted of 45 practitioners who were ‘working 
therapeutically’, utilising a variety of theories. Specifically, in the demographic 
questionnaire, 38 of the participants identified themselves as ‘female’ and 5 as ‘male’. 
2 participants did not disclose their gender. Their ages ranged from 30 to 70 years old. 
In terms of their professional backgrounds, out of the 45 participants, 25 of them were 
counsellors and therapists. The rest of them were psychologists and psychiatrists. In 
total, there were 14 counselling psychologists, 3 clinical psychologists and 3 
psychiatrists. One of the psychiatrists described himself as practicing 
psychodynamically and the rest of them did not disclose their theoretical orientation. 
All clinical psychologists were practicing in a CBT framework. Among the 
counselling psychologists, 8 were practicing in a pluralistic/integrative framework, 4 
were using cognitive behavioural or schema therapies, 1 was practicing 
psychodynamically and 1 did not disclose. Finally, 12 therapists described their 
practice as ‘integrative’, 6 as ‘person centred’, 2 as psychodynamic, 3 as CBT, 1 as 
‘transaction analysis’ and 1 did not disclose. 
Data Collection: Data were gathered electronically using ‘Qualtrics’ online survey 
software (http://www.qualtrics.com). In order to reach participants, I mostly used my 
professional network (i.e. the places I had done my placements in the past or I had 
worked). Specifically, I got in touch with organisations that employ therapeutic 
practitioners, such as mental health teams within the National Health Service (NHS), 
charities offering low-cost therapy and a university counselling service. I approached 
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them electronically and asked them to complete the study and, if possible, distribute 
the link to their networks. The study link was also posted in several Facebook groups, 
such as the ‘BPS Counselling Psychology Division’ page as well as the UKCP 
webpage. More information about the information sheet and the study advert can be 
found in the ‘Appendices’ section. 
Data Analysis: According Clarke (Clarke et al., 2017) data from story-completion 
tasks can be analysed in various ways. Pattern-based forms of discourse analysis, 
including FDA are amongst the methods that suit this form of research, as shown in 
previous studies (e.g. Walsh & Malson, 2010). In the absence of a ‘correct’ or 
privileged way of conducting an FDA, my analysis was informed by Willig’s (2008) 
six-stage process, as I found it easier to relate them to the requirements of a 
professional doctorate. In particular, I found Willig’s (2008) suggestions clearer and 
more focussed on the “consequences” of the different discourses for clinical practice 
(p. 117). In order to understand the poststructuralist ideas and the ways they can be 
applied in psychological research, I also consulted Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine’s 
(2008) chapter and Parker’s (1992) book. Hence, I created a set of flexible guidelines 
focusing on the emergent discourses, subjectivities and practices. 
In this section, I provide an overview of the analytic procedures used in the analysis 
of the stories. It should be noted that it does not constitute a full analysis in the 
Foucauldian sense, as it does not address the possible ‘discontinuation’ of discourses 
or their evolution over time (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008; Willig, 2008). As 
described below, the analysis was structured around these six steps. However, the 
overall analytic process was non-linear. In particular, during the analysis, I found 
considerable overlaps between the last three steps. That might be related to the fact 
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that what is being said or done from a particular ‘subject position’ depends to a large 
extent on the individual’s ‘subjectivity’. 
1. In accordance with Willig’s (2008) suggestions, at the start of the analytic process I 
read the stories multiple times and tried to identify the different ways that the 
discursive object of shame was constructed in them. Attention was paid to both implicit 
and explicit references on shame. Also, I put emphasis on what was not being said-
apart from what was said- and I highlighted all direct or indirect references to shame. 
2. Then, I tried to “locate” (Willig, 2008, p. 115) the various discourses participants 
drew upon when constructing the object of shame within various discursive 
frameworks (e.g. references on ‘humanistic’ and/or ‘psychodynamic’ discourses). In 
line with the Foucauldian philosophy, I was paying particular attention to the 
institutionalised nature of discourses and their power to regulate therapeutic practices 
(Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008). 
3. Next, I attempted to identify the ‘action orientation’ or the discursive function of 
the different discourses. In particular, I asked myself questions such as: “What is 
gained from constructing the object in this particular way at this particular point in the 
text? What is its function and how does it relate to other constructions produced in the 
surrounding text?” (p. 116). These questions aimed to identify the ways in which a 
particular discourse justifies certain practices. They also brought my attention to a 
‘macro-level’ conceptualisation of psychotherapy as a wider institution that legitimises 
certain ways of being for therapists and clients in relation to shame (Willig, 2008). 
4. At the next stage, I identified the ‘subject positions’ that became available through 
participants’ stories. In particular, I attended to the “ways-of-seeing and ways-of 
being” in the world that were constructed in the discourses (Willig, 2008, p. 117). For 
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example, the positivist discourse made available the subject position of the ‘expert 
practitioner’, who aims to alleviate shame.   
5. Then, I focussed on the opportunities for practice that become plausible from these 
positions. I paid attention to the ‘actions’ (both productive and restrictive) that follow 
from particular discourses. For example, by positioning ‘shame’ as part of a 
psychological condition, the practitioner is more likely to be constructed as 
‘responsible’ for treating it and the client as a passive recipient of the ‘expert’ 
knowledge. 
6. The final step aimed to explore the links between discourses and subjectivities (the 
previous three steps). In particular, it attended to the possible ‘realities’ that are 
constructed, given the available discourses and their arising subject positions. My aim 
at that stage was to integrate the previous analytic steps and provide an overview of 
what can be felt or done from the subject positions identified in step 4.   
 
The initial stages of the analysis consisted of multiple readings and personal reflections 
on the data, as a way to familiarise myself with the overarching constructions (steps 1, 
2) and subjectivities (steps 3, 4, 5) occurring across the dataset. After identifying major 
discursive themes and making notes in the participants’ stories, I started transforming 
them into fully-formed text (step 6). This stage included further clarification of the 
analytical work and engagement with the wider literature. Throughout the analytic 
process, I was aware that my work is highly influenced by my own subjectivity as a 
trainee counselling psychologist. Thus, I have included a section on my reflections and 
my own positioning as a researcher at the end of this chapter. Also, in Appendix 1 
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there is a more detailed description on “the use of self” throughout the research 
process. 
 
3.6. Ethical Considerations 
The study received favourable ethical opinion from the University of Surrey Faculty 
of Health and Medical Sciences Ethics Committee.4 Its conduct abided by the BPS 
Code of Human Research Ethics (BPS, 2014), the Ethics Guidelines for Internet-
Mediated Research (BPS, 2017b) and the University’s Faculty of Health and Medical 
Sciences Ethics Committee regulations (FHMSC).  
As I mentioned in the previous section, the original research proposal outlined 20 
participants as the final number. However, following consultation with my supervisor, 
it was agreed that I would probably need more participants, so the proposal was 
amended accordingly. Generally, the participants in this study were not considered a 
vulnerable group and story-completion tends to raise fewer ethical questions compared 
to studies that include direct interaction (Clarke et al., 2017). The potential 
participants’ discomfort was an important consideration throughout the study, though. 
In accordance with the BPS guidelines (BPS, 2014) with regard to participants’ 
welfare, they were provided with mine and my  supervisor’s email address and were 
encouraged to get in touch in case any questions or upsets arose. Moreover, they were 
informed of their right to withdraw from the study without further consequences.  
Furthermore, before deciding to participate in the study, participants were asked to 
read an information screen and click a separate box to indicate they had read and 
 
4 The letter of approval can be found in Appendix 3. 
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understood the information provided in order to proceed with the completion of the 
study. The research was designed in such a way that it was impossible for them to 
proceed to the completion of the study without having read the relevant information 
and indicated their consent first. The confidentiality and anonymity of participants was 
maintained throughout all parts of the analysis by giving unique IDs to each participant 
who completed the story online. Finally, participants were not asked any details that 
could identify them.  
3.7. Quality Assurance and Personal Reflexivity 
In order to ensure the quality of the analysis, I followed the qualitative procedures 
suggested by Henwood & Pidgeon (1992) and Willig (2008). In particular, the analysis 
of data was periodically checked by my supervisor as a way to increase its ‘credibility’ 
and make sure my interpretations were ‘grounded’ in the data. Quotes were also used 
throughout the analysis section to provide evidence of the discourses located in 
participants’ stories and support the analytic claims. Personal reflexivity is an essential 
part of quality-evaluation in research (Fossey, Harvey, Mcdermott, & Davidson, 
2002). Therefore, in all parts of this study, I paid particular attention to the ways that 
my views and assumptions might have impacted the findings. Apart from personal 
reflexivity, Willig (2008) emphasises the importance of methodological reflexivity as 
a way to improve the quality of research. In order to adhere to that criterion, I tried to 
consider alternative methods of analysis or epistemologies as a way to explore shame 
and how these might have shaped my findings. 
Overall, it is acknowledged that the analysis provides only a possible reading of the 
data, thus I aimed to be as tentative as possible in my interpretations. In accordance 
with Willig’s suggestions (Willig, 2008), I tried to provide details on the participants’ 
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professional background, as a way to allow the reader to assess the ‘transferability’ 
and ‘applicability’ of the findings in a different context. I also aimed to make 
appropriate references to theory in order to ensure the ‘clarity’ and the ‘coherence’ of 
the analysis. Compared to quantitative studies, in qualitative research, bias is seen as 
an inevitable part of the process (Parker, 1999). Therefore, instead of trying to 
minimise them, I tried to reflect on my personal and methodological assumptions at 
all stages of the research process. As mentioned earlier, I was keeping a research diary, 
parts of which can be found in Appendix 2. In line with the counselling psychology 
ethos (e.g. Strawbridge & Woofle, 2010), I endeavoured to increase my awareness of 
my own attitude towards shame and the ways it can be dealt with in the therapy room. 
These issues were discussed in both personal therapy and supervision throughout my 
training and thesis writing process.  
In terms of my own position as a researcher, it is worth mentioning that, before my 
training as a counselling psychologist I was working in the field of substance misuse 
and criminal justice, as a ‘recovery worker’. Throughout my time in these settings, I 
encountered a lot of shame in my work with clients and often found myself not 
knowing how to deal with it. Many of them were ashamed of their past or possible 
‘slips’ they had in their recovery. Upon entering this course, I was almost searching 
for the ‘best’ way to deal with similar situations, should they arise. However, my 
readings along with the familiarisation with the various epistemological frameworks 
made me more sceptical towards the concept of ‘best practice’ within the therapeutic 
framework. Besides, I was particularly fascinated by social constructionist ideas and 
the ways they can be applied in research and clinical practice (e.g. McNamee & 
Gergen, 1992). Finally, I concluded that the concept of ‘best’ practice depends to a 
great extent on the wider system and its values, as well as the context we examine it. 
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Based on the idea that there might be no superior way to deal with shame, I decided to 
explore the discourses that therapists draw upon when constructing therapeutic 
practice in relation to it.  
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4. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I analyse the stories completed by 45 therapists of various professional 
backgrounds and theoretical orientations.5 In accordance with the aims of the study, 
the analysis focuses on exploring the variations (Parker, 1992) in participants’ 
understandings of shame and the ‘subject positions’ or ‘the ways-of-being’ that 
become available. I also aim to explore how power relations are reflected in 
participants’ stories and their implications for therapeutic practice in relation to shame 
(Willig, 2008). 
In accordance with my research methodology, I utilise the Foucauldian theory and I 
am using extracts to evidence analytical work. In line with a critical realist position 
and previous discourse analytic studies (e.g. Avdi, 2005; Moore & Seu, 2010), I move 
beyond the text in order to contextualise the relevant discourses and understand their 
implications more fully. For this reason, the study has no separate ‘analysis’ and 
‘discussion’ sections. 
Throughout all stages of the analysis, I was reflecting on my own assumptions and was 
keeping a diary of this process. As mentioned earlier, the analysis of the stories reflects 
one of many possible interpretations, rather than the truth (Wetherell, Taylor & Yates, 
2001). During the analysis, I tried to preserve a constant awareness of my active role 
in the co-construction (Willig, 2008) of the research findings and have paid attention 
to the ways that my personal views about shame might have impacted participants’ 
stories. Thus, I have included the story-stem in the transcript and the analysis, as a way 
 
5 Please see ‘methods’ section for more information about the participants’ professional and theoretical 
backgrounds. 
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to consider the impact it may have had on the responses, whilst I reflect on my position 
as a researcher throughout different parts of the analysis. 
 
4.2. Overview of the Discourses 
Overall, the extracts showed the multitude of ways in which participants constructed 
shame in the therapeutic space. It should be noted that the distinctions implied in 
participants’ texts are artificial and aim to construct a coherent account of the data 
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Hence, I have structured the analysis around three 
overarching discourses, based on the constructions that seemed to prevail in most 
stories:  
• Shame as a ‘hidden self’ discourse 
• ‘Expert practitioner’ discourse 
• ‘Human practitioner’ discourse 
In accordance with previous discourse analytic studies (e.g. Moore & Seu, 2010), I 
have linked the overarching discourses with discursive subthemes and I am discussing 
them in relation to the wider literature.  
It is argued that when taken together these discourses construct ‘shame’ around the 
concept of a unified, ‘true self’, which is hidden behind it. The therapeutic work in 
relation to shame is based on therapists’ attempts to make the client talk about their 
hidden experiences. Indeed, most narratives were constructed around a tension 
between the clients’ tendency to hide their ‘true’ self behind shame and an impulse to 
‘confess’ the truth. I suggest that this is achieved by drawing on a humanistic discourse 
of self-unity (Rogers, 1979), which focuses on individual subjectivity and 
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conceptualises the ‘congruent self’ as a therapeutic ideal. This stance functions as a 
moral and normative discourse within many forms of therapy, including person-
centred and psychodynamic (Rogers, 1961; Winnicott, 1965). However, in an effort to 
resist the ‘pathologising’ discourses, these accounts could be seen as reinforcing the 
concept of a fragmented individual subjectivity, which is problematic in a variety of 
ways. In particular, it has been argued that by understanding clients’ problems solely 
as part of the private self without paying sufficient attention to the sociocultural 
context they are presenting, therapists are at risk of “reinforcing the very qualities of 
self that have initially caused the problem: its autonomous, bounded nature” 
(Cushman, 1990, p. 601).  
Based on these understandings, the therapist was positioned in various-often 
conflicting ways-in relation to shame (Potter, 1992). In particular, the therapist’s role 
was constructed in binary terms based on their ability to deal with it. Within the 
discourse of ‘expertise’, shame was understood as part of an internalised emotional or 
psychological difficulty that can be dealt with through the use of the appropriate 
psychological methods and the therapist was positioned as the ‘expert’ who utilises 
them effectively. Within this framework, the client was discoursed as a passive 
recipient of the therapist’s interventions, almost unable to deal with their shame by 
themselves. It was suggested that through the use of the ‘expert discourse’, participants 
reinforce ‘psychotherapy’ as an institution by positioning therapeutic practitioners as 
necessary in ‘helping’ clients move beyond their shame.  
Alternatively, shame was seen as co-constructed, in participants’ stories, with the 
therapist being positioned as another ‘human being’ who is affected by it and struggles 
to ‘contain it’. Therapists’ ‘struggles’, were discoursed as reducing the ‘credibility’ of 
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the therapist in some stories and thus, denigrating ‘psychotherapy’ as a powerful 
institution. I argue that the discourse of ‘human practitioner’ sits in opposition with 
the discourse of ‘expertise’ and has implications for therapeutic work and the power 
dynamics in the therapy room. Within the discourse of expertise, shame is 
conceptualised as a “locatable object of scrutiny” (Foucault, 1975, p. 146), which is 
manageable, whilst the therapist is positioned as powerful and capable of dealing with 
it. Although the practitioner is more reassured that shame can be recognised and 
managed within the session, when it is reduced to a pre-defined object, it is suggested 
that the possibilities of exploration (Avdi, 2005), along with the therapist’s tasks, are 
significantly limited.  
In the final section of the analysis, I reflect on my own positioning as a researcher and 
the ways that might have impacted participants’ responses. It is argued that despite the 
anonymity of the study, the awareness that their stories would be read and analysed by 
a fellow practitioner made it more likely for participants to draw on ‘expert’ discourses 
in order to legitimise the claims of their stories to another professional (Willig, 2008).  
In the following sections, I offer a deeper exploration of the discursive themes outlined 
above. Stories were randomly coded into numbers for identification, so within the 
analysis, extracts are presented as S1., S2. etc. whereby S1 means ‘Story 1’. 
 
4.3. Shame as a ‘Hidden Self’ 
As mentioned earlier, in most stories, shame was constructed around a narrative of a 
‘hidden self’, whilst participants assumed a ‘truth’ that had to be discovered, examined 
or interpreted by the therapist in order to help the client ‘move on’ from their shame. 
It could be argued that the concept of a ‘hidden’ self reflects a dualistic separation 
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between an external, false self and an internal, real one. Given the concept of the 
modern, autonomous selfhood which prevails in Western societies (Gergen, 2007) and 
the humanistic ideals (Rogers, 1979) that most participants drew on, these findings did 
not come as a surprise. On the contrary, it is suggested that psychotherapy, as an 
institution plays a part in reproducing the discourse of the self-regulated, inward 
looking self (Guilfoyle, 2002). 
4.3.1. ‘The False Self’ 
S 7. Jo was used to hiding her true feelings, that she was unlovable, from the world. 
Sitting with Alex, Jo felt she wanted to be real and honest about herself and her 
feelings. She wanted Alex to like her and value her the way Jo herself felt about Alex, 
but Jo found she couldn't quite believe that Alex would be able to accept her once she 
found out about all the dark feelings and thoughts she had. 
S. 32 Perhaps Jo has taken the first step in coming to therapy but is unsure of how to 
disclose the innermost part of her. The therapeutic alliance has not yet been 
established and she hasn’t built trust in the relationship. 
In S7, the client’s ‘true’ self is constructed as ‘flawed’ which is why it is kept private. 
By using the concepts of “hidden true feelings” being “valued” or “accepted”, this 
participant draws on a humanistic discourse, assuming a reality which is hidden behind 
shame. Within this framework, the construct of a consolidated, congruent self as a 
therapeutic ‘ideal’ forms a big part of the psychological work (Gergen, 1995). It could 
be said that participants in the above extracts assume an authentic, ‘real’, “innermost” 
part, which is hidden by shame but can be understood under the right circumstances 
(i.e. “established alliance/trust”). These constructions seem to imply a ‘true/internal’ 
and a ‘false/outer’ self, whilst the self that is hidden is more ‘real’ than the one that is 
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presented to the therapist. Based on these understandings of the individual, many forms 
of therapy aim to help the client get in touch with their ‘true self’ or be more 
‘congruent’ (e.g. Rogers, 1961; Winnicott, 1965). Arguably, these conceptualisations 
of the individual as having an internal, core self which is hidden behind shame-related 
behaviours reinforce the Western ideals and legitimise psychotherapy as an institution 
that reproduces the discourse of the autonomous ‘selfhood’. 
4.3.2. ‘The Autonomous Self as a Therapeutic Ideal’ 
S 11. Jo also discloses that she doesn't like to feel 'needy' and having these feelings 
towards Alex does indeed make her feel needy and embarrassed that she might value 
Alex's approval. 
S 36. Jo reflects that they are feeling ashamed about coming to therapy: they have 
always prided themselves on being "self-sufficient", and they feel that attending 
therapy is an "admission of failure". Alex explores this further with Jo – over some 
time, perhaps multiple sessions – in relation to Jo's upbringing – Jo recognises that, 
growing up, their parents encouraged them to be independent, and they felt their 
parents did not acknowledge their "difficult" feelings, particularly feelings of 
vulnerability. Jo also reflects that they feel guilty about taking Alex's time, when they 
feel there are other people in the world who have a greater need for support. Alex 
explores Jo's feelings of guilt, and continues to explore their sense of what it means 
for them to come to therapy. Alex works with Jo to construct an image of themselves 
that encompasses coming to therapy – e.g., it might be that Jo reframes the action by 
emphasising their self-sufficiency in acting independently to seek help, and in taking 
action towards their therapeutic goals as a result of therapy. 
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The clients in these stories are constructed as shamed for their “feelings”, and in 
particular their vulnerability, whilst the therapist – in an indirect way – “reframes” the 
clients’ narrative, almost praising their “self-sufficiency” and their ability to “act 
independently”.  
From a post-structuralist perspective, the construction of shame as related to being 
“needy” and incompetent could be seen as socioculturally related to the values of 
Modernity with regard to autonomy, self-sufficiency and rationality (Gergen, 1999; 
Sampson, 1993). Besides, these values are constructed as therapeutic ideals in many 
forms of therapy. In previous postmodern literature (e.g. Guilfoyle, 2002), it has been 
suggested that in most forms of psychological work, ‘self-containment’ is legitimised 
as a preferred way of being, whereas alternative versions of the self are discursively 
minimised by therapists. In humanistic forms of therapy, for example, the therapist 
aims to help the client discover their own values, find agency and liberate themselves 
from the conditions that others impose on them for acceptance (Rogers, 1961). As 
mentioned earlier, the concepts of self-acceptance and ‘agency’ could be seen as 
reinforcing the Western values of autonomy and individualism by proposing that 
individuals have a core self that can be self-actualised. On the contrary, shame-related 
behaviours, with their focus on how one is perceived by others and their tendency to 
make them passively ‘withdraw’ (e.g. Black, Curran & Dyer, 2013) rather than ‘act’ 
in an independent, rational way could be seen as a rather ‘maladaptive’ alternative to 
the Western ideals of autonomy and self-agency.  
4.3.3. ‘Technologies of Confession’ 
As mentioned earlier, most participants constructed shame as an internalised, hidden 
emotion, whilst the aim of therapy was to create the appropriate environment that 
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would make the client get in touch with their ‘true self’ by revealing their thoughts or 
feelings. It could be argued that in most narratives, shame was constructed as a barrier 
to the therapeutic ideal of self-revelation that had to be overcome through the client’s 
confession. Indeed, most stories were structured around a ‘happy ending’, whereby the 
client managed to talk about their shame and the feelings behind it and thus, felt 
liberated. The discourse of ‘confession’ seemed evident in the data whilst the therapist 
was discoursed as having an active role in transforming a set of shame-related 
behaviours in therapeutically relevant material that could potentially serve the 
institutional objectives of therapy (Georgaka & Avdi, 2009). 
S. 40 Jo tells Alex she has never spoken about this before, and she’s not even clear 
that it’s anything that important, but Alex can sense it is troubling her and reflects that 
back to her. Alex senses a mixture of reluctance and eagerness to “spit out” what 
happened, and asks Jo if that indeed is what is going on for her. Jo nods, and agrees 
“exactly that, but I think I’d have to tell you other stuff about me.......” “Which you 
don’t yet want to tell me?” “No”  
The above narrative is constructed around a tension between a tendency to ‘hide’ 
behind shame-related behaviours and an impulse to confess. The therapist could be 
seen as a powerful figure, able to have an accurate idea of what is going on for the 
client and with an active role in driving the therapeutic process and influencing the 
client’s self-narrative. Shame seems to be constructed as “reluctance” and, in a way, 
as ‘resistance’ to self-revelation to the therapist.  
It is suggested that the concept of a client who is avoiding open communication goes 
against the construct of an ideal, typical therapeutic session, whereby the therapist is 
doing what they are trained to do – being offered a narrative and trying to make sense 
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of it (Georgaka & Avdi, 2009); without the ‘confession’ the therapist is left clueless 
and potentially powerless, as they do not know how to manage the client’s shame. 
Indeed, for Foucault, the act of ‘confession’ is one of the most pervasive examples of 
a ‘power-knowledge’ relationship, as it offers to the person who is in authority a 
resource by which the other person can be assessed and dealt with, in accordance with 
their wishes (Foucault, 1978). However, the compulsion to reveal our ‘true selves’, as 
described in the previous section, has become so deeply entrenched in Western 
societies that it is no longer experienced as a constraining power (Foucault, 1998). 
Instead, it is constructed as the ‘true’ voice that demands expression in order to feel 
‘liberated’, whilst any reluctance to confess is conceptualised as the effect of a 
constraint (Besley, 2005). Foucault (Foucault, 1978) also compared the need to ‘talk 
about our inner self’ to an authority figure with religious practices, whereby the 
‘sinner’ confesses their sin to the priest in order to get forgiveness. Similarly to 
therapeutic practices, ‘telling the truth’ is constructed as an important value, and the 
more open someone is about their ‘sins’, the more likely they are to feel liberated 
afterwards. 
S 42. Alex was an experienced therapist and was able to contain her shame and work 
with the anger in the transference. After a few sessions, Jo was able to talk more openly 
about her difficulties in their relationship to him and they gradually managed to move 
beyond that. Their relationship helped Jo identify alternative ways of expressing her 
emotions, which eventually made her more able to talk to her mother about the way 
she was feeling. 
In the above extract, the participant draws on the psychodynamic discourse to attribute 
meaning to the interaction between the characters. The therapist’s role is understood 
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in terms of managing to “contain” the client’s shame and “work with the transference”. 
The concept of the ‘container’ forms a part of psychodynamic therapy (Lemma, 2003). 
However, it could be argued that it positions the client as a rather passive and 
powerless ‘object’ whose emotions (i.e. “anger” or shame) can be “contained” within 
the boundaries of the therapeutic relationship, which are set by the therapist. Further, 
successful therapy entails managing to make the client “talk more openly” about their 
shameful “feelings” to the therapist and eventually “move beyond” them. It could be 
suggested that the discourse of ‘confession’ legitimises therapeutic work by 
positioning the therapist as a “container” for clients’ shame, that needs to be contained 
by the therapist, whose presence is necessary, in order to help them “move beyond” 
their shame and talk about their feelings. Within this framework, the therapist could 
be seen as a ‘powerful’ figure, who is able to use his “experience” in order to 
understand the client’s transference and make her overcome her shame and express 
herself. 
S. 29 Jo – I feel ashamed, Alex – why do you feel that way, Jo? Jo – I don't know if I 
want to talk about it, that's just how I feel at the moment it will go like all feelings do. 
Alex – Jo, the reason you are here is to find out what is going on inside you so you 
can, as you said last week, get out of this constant emotional cycle. 
S. 35 Jo looks down as she said this and tentatively glanced at Alex as though expecting 
a reply or clarification. Alex undeterred, communicated that he heard her. He added 
empathically that he isn't here to judge her and if she feels comfortable, he would hear 
what she had to disclose in her own time. Jo said she can't find the words to describe 
it and then looks away, appearing nervous. Alex stayed silent although appearing 
attentive to give her some space. Jo appeared uncomfortable with the silence and Alex 
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sensing this checked in with Jo, asking her how she is feeling at the moment. Jo replied 
that she is ok and Alex asked if Jo would like him to ask her some questions to help 
her speak. Alex felt that Jo's shame might have something to do with the fact that there 
is a gender difference, however uncertain to what it might entail. Could it be related 
to her relationship with her partner, her sexuality, some transgression, or something 
from her childhood? He thought since it's their second session, it is unlikely that there 
is an erotic transference, however, he hasn't fully understood how she relates to men. 
Therapists in most stories, including both of the above extracts, are constructed as 
working to elicit emotions talk by the client and re-frame it as therapeutically relevant 
statements, based on their theoretical approach (i.e. “transference reactions”). In the 
above extracts, including S. 42, the therapist’s interventions are based on the 
assumption that the client is struggling due to “unexpressed” feelings and that therapy 
aims to help them voice them in order to deal with them better.  
It could be argued that these narratives recall Hook’s (2001) analysis of the functions 
of psychodynamic therapists’ interventions in terms of transforming the clients’ 
accounts into versions of psychological difficulties appropriate for therapeutic work 
and training them to talk about themselves in ways consistent with the therapeutic 
discourse. It has also been suggested that successful interventions in most approaches 
are understood in terms of providing the “tools for facilitating the client’s progress 
along the path prescribed by the aim of therapy” (Georgaka & Avdi, 2009, p. 40). 
Indeed, Besley (2005) wrote that the ‘confession’ is not only a communicative and 
expressive act; rather, within the therapeutic framework, clients almost recreate 
themselves through their narrative and bring the spheres of private, public, past and 
future together, in a dialogue with another. 
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4.3.4. ‘Shame as a Boundary to One’s Deepest Emotions’ 
It is worth mentioning that in both S. 29 and S. 42 emotions are discoursed as being of 
more central importance in the person’s experience, in a way being the most ‘real’ part 
compared to their behaviours, which could be why the therapist puts more emphasis 
on them. This view is accordant with many philosophical theories, such as ‘emotivism’ 
or ‘expressivist aesthetics’ (Harre, 1986). Although shame is also an emotion, it could 
be said that, compared to other emotions, which are often constructed as ‘passions’, 
outside the person’s ‘control’ (Pattison, 2000) it acts as a boundary to the expression 
of the ‘deepest’ parts of one’s psyche. This ‘boundary’ can be problematic, especially 
in therapies that are based on the concept of a deeper intrapsychic structure. In 
psychodynamic theories, for example, shame-related behaviours are constructed as 
defences in the form of avoidance that need to be ‘discovered' (Petraglia, Bhatia & 
Drapeau, 2017). In contrast with these assumptions, a social constructionist view of 
emotions rejects the concept of a buried, hidden emotion that pre-exists inside the 
person. Instead, emotions are seen as created by the particular context (Armon-Jones, 
1986), whilst the object of ‘self’ is understood as a construct produced through social 
interaction and does not exist independently of people’s awareness (Gergen, 2011). 
Based on these conceptualisations, it is suggested that therapists’ assumptions in 
relation to which behaviours are problematic can play a role in the client’s direction of 
change.  
Not surprisingly, a client’s ‘confession’ is constructed as highly valued by the 
therapist. It is usually met with validation, acceptance and empathy, reaffirming the 
client’s new re-created narrative. In most stories, talking about emotions is constructed 
as ‘liberation’, which can then bring change or open the door for the ‘help’ to be 
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offered. In accordance with the discourse of the ‘real’ self, the stories within the 
discourse of ‘confession’ imply that what is revealed to the therapist is the ‘truth’. 
S 33. Jo decides to break her silence and discloses that she had started an affair about 
a year ago and this is the main reason she wants to end the relationship. She feels very 
guilty about that but she doesn’t want to be in the relationship anymore. Alex listens 
to her carefully and asks her how she feels for disclosing this information to her. Jo 
describes feeling relieved and safer now. Both of them feel that the relationship has 
deepened following Jo’s disclosure. 
‘Confession’ could be seen as ‘catharsis’ for the client in this extract, as shame or the 
difficulties behind it become more tolerable. In accordance with Foucault’s 
observations, ‘the confession of truth’ has the effect of changing the individual making 
the confession. “Whether by way of experiencing a sense of liberation, of being 
unburdened or being forgiven for one's sins the confession works directly on the 
confessor” (Foucault, 1978, p. 63). 
Overall, it could be suggested that these extracts echo wider institutional assumptions 
about what makes a good therapeutic relationship or ‘good therapy’, more broadly. For 
example, a client who is “open” about their emotions is constructed as a good 
candidate for therapy in most approaches, whereas someone who displays shame-
related behaviours is not always ‘suitable’ (Rueve & Correll, 2006). It is therefore 
argued that the therapeutic agenda reflects the ‘embeddedness’ of psychotherapeutic 
practices in a broader context of socioculturally sanctioned discourses (Avdi & 
Georgaka, 2007).  
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4.4. Therapist as ‘Expert’ 
Within the previous section, it was suggested that shame is constructed as an emotion 
that aims to hide the client’s ‘true’ self. Hence, the therapist’s task was understood in 
terms of managing to make the clients reveal themselves. This discourse made 
available the subject position of the ‘expert’ therapist, who has the skills to deal with 
shame by “normalising” or “containing it”, following the client’s disclosure.  
S3. Alex gently probes, making comments about Jo's body language. Jo discloses a 
history of trauma. Alex teaches Jo grounding exercises, ways to relieve distress. Alex 
spends a few sessions making sure Jo is able to minimize distress before they elect to 
explore the trauma. Once Jo is able to self-regulate, they begin to explore Jo's past 
and the impact it has on the present. Jo is able to self-regulate and prevent flashbacks 
and dissociation. 
In this story, the participant could be seen as drawing on a positivist discourse, 
constructing the therapist as an expert who has the skills to “teach” the client exercises 
to “relieve” their distress. Thus, shame-related “distress” seems to be a problem to be 
solved and the therapist is the one who knows how this can be done. The client, on the 
other hand could be seen as a passive recipient of the therapist’s knowledge, without 
which she is unable to “self-regulate”, whilst her body language is monitored and 
commented on by the therapist. This view could be seen as accordant with Foucault’s 
observations, whereby knowledge and power are always entangled with each other 
(Foucault, 1998). Indeed, within the discourse of ‘expertise’, the therapist’s skills put 
him in a position of power in relation to the client, who is dependent on him in order 
to regulate their emotions. However, by constructing the client as unable to self-
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regulate, it could be argued that the power struggles that take place in the session are 
concealed.  
It is suggested that by constructing shame as related to pre-defined, knowable 
conditions, such as “trauma”, participants reinforce psychotherapy as an institution by 
positioning the therapeutic practitioner as necessary in the possession of unique 
knowledge. For example, in the above story, the client was constructed as “unable to 
self-regulate” and thus, needing the contribution of the expert-therapist to do that. 
Following the application of prescribed knowledge, they are “able to self-regulate and 
prevent flashbacks and dissociation”.  
It could be said that the discourse of therapists’ ‘expertise’ legitimises psychotherapy 
as a profession and, in a way, aligns it with more powerful professions, such as 
medicine and psychiatry that draw on similar a evidence base to justify their practices. 
At the same time, the construction of a client who is “unable to self-regulate” 
legitimises the training of therapeutic practitioners as ‘experts’ in clients’ shame and 
thus, able to engage them in specific ways. It could also be said that ‘shame’ in itself 
can be related to a variety of things. However, by linking it with “a history of trauma”, 
it becomes more knowable and further justifies the role of the therapeutic practitioner, 
as someone who is trained to deal with it. Overall, the conceptualisation of the client 
as ‘passive’, needy or vulnerable is accordant with shame-related behaviours, as shame 
has been historically linked with one’s attempts to hide their weaknesses and avoid 
exposure to a powerful, external presence (Seu, 2006). 
S 18. Depending on the dynamics in the session the therapist could go offer some 
psycho-education on the nature of shame and related emotions such as guilt, 
embarrassment etc. 
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In this extract, shame is constructed as part of a predefined category of emotions, along 
with “guilt, embarrassment etc.”, for which the therapist can offer “psychoeducation”. 
This participant draws on a renowned psychological theory of shame, which describes 
it as part of the ‘self-conscious emotions’, along with guilt, embarrassment and pride 
(Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Similarly to the previous extract (S. 2), whereby shame is 
conceptualised as part of a “history of trauma”, it could be argued that by integrating 
shame into a pre-existing theory, it becomes a locatable object that can be described 
and scrutinised (Foucault, 1972). In a way, by ‘reducing’ an ambiguous, complex 
emotion such as shame to a pre-defined category, it is easier to ‘do’ something about 
it by treating it (Harper, 1994). At the same time, it could be said that the use of 
‘expert’, well-evidenced discourses enhances the status of psychotherapy as a 
powerful institution by adding weight to participants’ claims through their stories. 
4.4.1. ‘Treating Shame’ 
Similarly to the above story, the participant in the extract below constructed shame 
within a cognitive behavioural framework, understanding it as part of the client’s 
distorted, “critical thinking”. Based on this view, the therapist utilises a variety of 
evidence-based techniques to ‘resolve’ it:  
S 10. It was important to address and welcome discussion about shame (initially just 
to clarify that this is the emotion underlying their distress), so that we can educate 
about shame as an emotion – normalise their reaction / use of shame – and challenge 
the associated cognitive distortions. Alex would also want to support development of 
Jo recognising things to be proud of, so she can build a sense of 'pride' in herself to 
counteract the shame. Alex recognises that it isn't easy to feel 'pride' in oneself as and 
will support Jo slowly but steadily to build her positive self image – looking at 
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individual strengths from childhood upwards (using examples to draw upon – so if 
they have passed any exams in the past or learnt to drive – these are achievements to 
be proud of, but often forgotten, and we can derive positive qualities that Jo must have, 
in order to have achieved these results). Alex will also be building Jo's resources and 
skills in self compassion / self reassurance where possible […]. All this work has 
helped us to address the anxiety and depression that Jo initially presented with; 
without addressing her chronic shame relationship, I feel Jo would have felt stuck in 
relation to developing strategies for the anxiety and depression.  
Shame-related behaviours in this extract are discoursed as associated with several 
“cognitive distortions”. In accordance with a cognitive behavioural perspective 
(Greenberger & Padesky, 1995), the participant understood the therapist’s task in 
terms of “educating” the client about them and “challenging” them. This story seems 
to reflect a positivist understanding of shame as a problem that needs to be solved, 
which sits in tension with a poststructuralist view of psychological difficulties. Within 
the poststructuralist framework, the concept of a pre-defined psychological problem is 
rejected. Instead, it is suggested that the ‘diagnosis’ is socially constructed by 
transforming observable behaviours into symptoms (Harper, 1994). In a similar vein, 
it could be argued that participants in the above stories understood the therapist’s task 
in terms of ‘reformulating’ the clients’ behaviours into pre-existing categories (i.e. 
“trauma history”/‘self-conscious emotions’), which can be dealt with by therapeutic 
methods (e.g. “psychoeducation” or “mindfulness techniques”). Hence, the therapist 
can be seen as ‘empowered’ with the knowledge to treat shame-related behaviours 
through the use of the ‘right’ techniques. It could also be said that by transforming a 
set of behaviours into a category that falls into the psychological domain, the expertise 
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and the ‘necessity’ of the therapeutic practitioner is further legitimised (Guilfoyle, 
2002). 
At the same time though, this position reduces the possibilities for exploring one’s 
experience further and understanding its subjective meaning, which can be 
problematic (Avdi, 2005). On a broader level, it could be argued that despite the 
‘empowerment’ that therapeutic practitioners might get from the use of particular 
techniques, they are seen as unreliable to a certain extent, as they constantly need to 
‘justify’ their practices against externally regulated procedures. As a result, there is 
limited space for consideration of the client as an individual and a formulation of their 
shame and shame-related behaviours in their context. 
It is suggested that the discourse of the ‘expert practitioner’ acts as a ‘technology of 
subjectivity’ (Foucault, 1980), whereby therapeutic skills and practice are used to 
construct a self that can be internally and externally regulated (Heenan, 2006). By 
drawing on pre-defined psychological theories when constructing shame, the 
therapist’s task is externally but clearly defined and shame-related behaviours become 
recognisable. Otherwise, there seem to be endless possibilities, which make the job of 
the therapist more challenging. Besides, it is more difficult to be monitored and 
evaluated by wider institutions. At the same time though, since the therapist has the 
tools to deal with shame-related behaviours, they are deemed accountable for doing it. 
Thus, responsibility and accountability lie with the individual therapist, rather than the 
client or the institution. 
S 20. Jo had never revealed her experience to anyone else and needed unconditional 
validation of her feelings, reassurance, explanation (psychoeducation), 
understanding, support. Jo continued to see Alex each week for just over a year. 
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During this time, they made great progress. Jo was becoming more confident and 
taking more responsibility in her social networks.  
In both the above extracts and S. 10, there are various references to the need to 
“address” the client’s shame, in order to help her develop a set of skills to deal with 
the related anxiety and depression or more generally “make progress”. Indeed, the 
discourse of “making progress” was evident in most stories, regardless of the 
theoretical framework participants drew on. This might be seen as reflecting the 
institutional pressure on both the client and the practitioner for the clients ultimately 
to ‘recover’, which is also part of various policies, including the ‘recovery agenda’ 
(Fernandez, 2018). Based on these ideas, it might be argued that the therapist needs to 
make the client progress and overcome their shame in order to justify their credibility. 
Overall, the discourse of expertise is accordant with Craven & Coyle’s (2007) 
observations of the ‘empiricist discourse’ whereby the psychologist is positioned as an 
‘expert’ who has the skills and the power to objectively categorise and treat 
psychological difficulties. It could be said that the discourse of ‘expertise’ tends to 
become a regime of truth within the psychological framework. In fact, with the model 
of the ‘scientist practitioner’ gaining more and more ground in clinical practice and 
training, the concept of reliance upon ‘official’ sources of knowledge as the best 
practice is reinforced (Bury & Strauss, 2006).  
By constructing the therapist as an ‘expert’ and the client as a passive recipient of 
widely used therapeutic practices, it could be said that this discourse ‘depersonalises’ 
and objectifies them. The therapist is constructed as an operator of pre-existing, 
decontextualised shame theories and the client as an object of their interventions, 
which are not based on an individual formulation of their shame. This could be seen 
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as rather concerning, as it obscures the contribution of sociocultural and interpersonal 
forces in conceptualising shame. Moreover, it sits in tension with the theories that 
emphasise the ‘embeddedness’ of emotional experiences within social relations 
(Leeming & Boyle, 2004). 
It is argued that the discourse of ‘humane practitioner’ I am describing below provides 
an alternative to the discourse of ‘expertise'. It is worth mentioning that in most stories, 
the therapists could still be seen as expected to hold a ‘powerful’ therapeutic position. 
Nevertheless, they are also constructed as ‘vulnerable’ and impacted by the intensity 
of shame, in some stories.  
 
4.5. Therapist as ‘Human’ 
Although some participants positioned the therapist as the ‘expert’ who knows the 
appropriate ways to help the client deal with shame, others used more ‘humane’ terms 
when constructing them in their stories. Within the discourse of ‘human practitioner’, 
the therapist was potentially vulnerable in relation to shame. In contrast with the 
‘expert’ practitioner discourse, whereby shame is constructed as a manageable object, 
shame here is constructed as a powerful emotion, with the potential to impact both the 
client and the therapist.  
4.5.1. ‘Shifts in Power Dynamics’ 
S 11. Alex begins to notice a feeling of discomfort and self-consciousness in herself. 
She has become more aware of how she is in front of Jo, her body, her words, facial 
expression and silences between them. Alex feels changed (she is different in front of 
Jo now) and slightly decentred. Alex wonders whether or not to share this with Jo, but 
decides not to because it may create more shame for her. Instead, Alex decides to 
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explore with Jo why she thinks she might be feeling shame in response to her feelings 
towards Alex. 
In this extract, the therapist is constructed as “decentred” by the client’s shame and 
rather unsure of what to do with it. It could be argued that power and agency are shifted 
more towards the client, whose emotions have the potential to make the therapist feel 
“uncomfortable and self-conscious”. Rather than being a passive recipient, ‘entitled’ 
to the expert’s interventions, the client is conceptualised as more accountable for 
dealing with her shame through mutual “exploration”. Shame is therefore understood 
as ‘co-created’ in the session and the therapist decides to “explore” it, rather than 
‘resolve’ it.  
It is suggested that this discourse sits in tension with the discourse of ‘expertise’. As 
shown in the previous section, the therapist was positioned as powerful and ‘equipped’ 
to resolve shame, based on their knowledge of the appropriate psychological tools. 
However, when shame is not constructed as a pre-defined condition, the therapist 
seems to be faced with many possibilities in terms of how to manage it. Therefore, as 
demonstrated in the stories, they are more exposed and vulnerable, as there is no ‘right’ 
way to deal with it, which may provoke more anxiety.  
Furthermore, it could be said that what makes shame different from other presentations 
in the therapy room is its ‘relativity’. As described earlier, shame can be understood 
from a variety of perspectives ranging from a psychiatric diagnosis, part of someone’s 
personality structure or a reaction to a particular context. The variety of ways that 
shame can be approached, along with the intensity it can generate can make it more 
likely for practitioners to draw on pre-defined techniques in order to feel more certain 
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that they can deal with it and avoid the experience of being “decentred” as described 
above. 
Nevertheless, within the discursive framework, participants’ constructions can move 
between subject positions in a fluid way (Foucault, 1980). Indeed, in some of the 
stories, participants’ conceptualisations ‘slipped’ between different subjectivities 
within the same narrative. In the extract below, the therapist was constructed as an 
expert who has the skills to deal with shame, as well as a ‘human’ affected by it: 
S 16. Alex doesn't know how to respond to that. A part of him wants to approach Jo 
and directly ask her what is going on for her. He wants to tell her that he feels she has 
been avoiding something. However, he is not sure if that would further distance her 
and how this may impact their relationship. Jo senses his uncertainty and finally 
discloses her concerns. Alex tries to respond gently and reassures her that it is 'ok' to 
be feeling that way, trying to normalise her shame. 
The therapist in this extract is constructed both as uncertain in terms of how to 
approach the client’s shame and rather confident that they can deal with it by 
“responding gently” and “normalising” it. This position could be seen as close to the 
concept of ‘safe uncertainty’ whereby the therapist is confident enough to bear the 
uncertainty of taking relational risks (Mason, 1993).  
4.5.2. ‘Uncontained’ Shame 
As described in the methodology section, in the story-stem that was given to 
participants, the therapist was described as “puzzled” in terms of what is going on for 
the client. Within the stories, there were great variations in terms of how the therapist’s 
confusion was interpreted and how this might impact the session.  
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S 17. Alex wonders if Jo's shame could possibly partly stem from Alex's expression of 
being surprised and puzzled … More specifically Alex wonders if perhaps his 
confusion/being puzzled and not feeling confident as a therapist was communicated 
through the facial expression and received as a message of criticism/ unsafety/ 
exposure from Jo, not allowing Jo to feel held/ contained and trusting, leading to Jo's 
shame. 
In this story, the therapist’s reaction of being “puzzled” seemed to be conceptualised 
as a lack of confidence from the therapist, which, in turn, had a negative impact on the 
client, making her feel uncontained and thus unable to trust her therapist. This story 
draws on a psychodynamic discourse, whereby the therapist’s task is understood in 
terms of “holding” the client’s shame. Within this framework, the therapist’s 
vulnerability might indeed be interpreted as problematic, as in most psychodynamic 
traditions the therapist is expected to be a powerful, detached figure in order to provide 
a ‘blank screen’ for the client to project their experiences (Lemma, 2003). It might be 
argued that both the client and the therapist within this extract are constructed as 
disempowered in relation to shame; the client feels “uncontained”, which leads to 
further shame, whilst the therapist feels unable to “hold” it and manage it effectively. 
If one could go further, we could say that a ‘confused’ therapist almost threatens the 
‘credibility’ of psychotherapy as an institution, at least in the ways it is understood 
from a psychodynamic perspective. 
In a similar vein, the client as well as the therapist are constructed as deskilled and 
powerless in relation to shame in the extract below: 
S 23. Alex, recently qualified, is a highly self-critical person, and, as his questions 
gradually met the same evasive minimal response, his own anxiety became difficult to 
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contain, and he responded – as he always does (a matter taken regularly to 
supervision) by intensifying, or heating up, his attentive empathic manner. He is good 
with effusive expressive clients; Alex and Jo are a perfect match. They cook up together 
a powerful climate of joint shame: Jo is deeply ashamed of his failure to answer 
questions, and his failure not to experience Alex's attention as yet more parental 
scrutiny; Alex is ashamed of his failure to manage Jo's evasiveness. They are in a 
transferential impasse. Jo stops answering questions. In the agonising silence, Alex 
begins to feel as he did in his parents' home before life, in his mid-thirties, began to 
offer him a sense of hope and direction.  
In this story, the uncertainty that the therapist feels in relation to the client’s shame is 
constructed as preventing him from doing what he needs to do as a therapist, which is 
being “empathic” and “attentive” to the client’s shame. Through the use of rather 
powerful terms, this difficulty is constructed as “failure” and all these reactions are “a 
matter to be taken to supervision”. It could be contended that therapists’ vulnerability 
and/or “anxiety” in relation to shame is conceptualised in negative terms, being seen 
almost as the opposite of a confident, reassured therapist, as constructed within the 
discourse of ‘expertise’.  
Shame here is constructed as a rather powerful object, with both the therapist and the 
client being rather passive and powerless in relation to it. Compared to S. 17 though, 
whereby it is only the therapist who has responsibility both for its management and 
creation, in this extract, shame is understood in more intersubjective terms as “cooked 
up together” between the therapist and the client. Thus, it could be suggested that the 
client is constructed as less passive and therefore more accountable for dealing with it.  
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4.5.3. Shame as a Powerful External Object 
It was noted that, in S. 23, the participant used rather strong metaphors such as 
“powerful climate of joint shame” or an “agonising silence” when describing the 
characters’ experiences of shame. In the same vein, the participant in the next extract 
is describing shame in dramatic metaphors, constructing it as “toxic” for the 
therapeutic relationship: 
S 25. I have always felt shame is one of the most complex emotions to work with. It can 
feel so toxic, for the client and in the therapeutic relationship. It takes away so much 
of the client’s agency and pollutes their sense of self, even in some cases leading the 
client to question if the "deserve" therapy, positive regard and recovery. I am struck 
by Jo's bravery in admitting feeling ashamed as an incredibly hard thing to disclose. 
Through the use of rather powerful terms, shame in this extract is understood as a 
potentially dangerous, external object, with the capacity to kill both the therapist and 
the client with its ‘toxicity’. The descriptions in both S. 23 and S. 25 could be seen as 
“extreme case formulations” (Promerantz, 1986, p. 219), which are rhetorical devices, 
used to strengthen someone’s position, display investment or a particular stance 
towards some state of affairs. It could be argued that in the above extract, the 
challenging nature of shame in the therapy room is emphasised through the use of more 
extreme terms. Shame is therefore constructed as a problematic emotion, which is 
about the whole “sense of self”, rather than an act or behaviour (Morrison, 2011).  
It is also worth noting that, although most participants completed the story-stem by 
describing the imaginary characters, others reflected on their personal difficulties of 
dealing with shame in the therapy room, almost positioning themselves as the 
therapists of the story (S. 10, S. 25). It could be hypothesised that in S. 25, the 
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participant identified with the role of ‘Alex’, to some extent, and provided a mixture 
of her personal reflections and a story about the characters. Despite the anonymity of 
the task, the awareness that their responses would be read and analysed by a fellow 
practitioner probably made it more likely for participants to draw on an ‘expert’ 
discourse, reflecting on their own ways or the challenges of dealing with shame, in 
order to ‘justify’ their stance to me. This is further demonstrated in the stories, where 
participants drew on particular therapeutic jargon (i.e. “transferential impasse”, 
“cognitive distortion”) to describe shame, assuming that it is going to be understood 
by the reader. Besides, from a discourse analytic perspective, by naming or labelling a 
behaviour, a therapist conveys a powerful message that they are familiar with it and 
have seen it before (Boyle, 2005). Therefore, it might be said that both me, as a 
researcher, and the participants are positioned in the same group of ‘experts’ in relation 
to shame, which is constructed as a recognisable object.  
4.5.4. ‘Therapist’s Vulnerability as Liberating’ 
In most of the extracts described up to now, the therapist’s vulnerability in relation to 
shame was understood as rather ‘problematic’. However, in some stories, the 
therapist’s ‘confession’ of being vulnerable was constructed as a basic tool to 
communicate their empathy and acceptance to the client, and thus it could be seen as 
a positive element of the therapeutic work, in accordance with the humanistic values 
(Mearns & Thorne, 2007). 
S 2. Jo shrinks back in her chair. Holding her breath. Shoulders drooping. Looking 
down. Small. Ashamed. Alex waits. Silence feels important. Then she says 'then all of 
this would be over? Tears begin to well in Jo's eyes. 'Yes.' She slowly looks up at Alex. 
There are tears in Alex's eyes too. Jo is worried that she has made Alex cry. Alex says 
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she feels the sadness in Jo's life. She says she can't take away the sadness but she is 
going to sit with Jo in her darkness. As tears roll down her face, Jo looks into Alex's 
face and sees acceptance. This time her sigh is one of relief. 
In this extract, the tears in the therapist’s eyes seem to be constructed as ‘proof’ of her 
“acceptance” and her willingness to “sit with the client’s darkness”. The construction 
of the therapist’s vulnerability as a helpful aspect of therapeutic work sits in tension 
with the psychodynamic discourse, as described in the above extracts (S. 17, 23), 
whereby the “experience” and “confidence” of the therapist are more valued. It could 
be contended that both vulnerability and self-disclosure are considered almost ‘taboo’ 
topics within the analytic framework, whereas in most humanistic forms of therapy, 
emotional expressivity and ‘authentic dialogue’ are more valued (Geller, 2003). Apart 
from that, within Rogerian psychotherapy, the therapist aims to maintain a ‘non-
authoritarian’ stance, based on Roger’s ideas that “therapy and authority cannot exist 
in the same relationship” (Rogers, 1942, p. 109).  
Therefore, it could be argued that the therapist’s vulnerability in the last extract 
eliminates the power imbalances in the session by constructing her as another human 
being who is impacted by shame and makes her client worry about her. This shift in 
power dynamics is conceptualised as a catalyst in the creation of a good therapeutic 
relationship as it communicates the therapist’s acceptance to the client.  
 
4.6. Summary of Findings and Conclusions  
In sum, in the present analysis it was suggested that therapists’ positioning in relation 
to shame was constructed in binary terms, reflecting the ideological tensions within 
different therapeutic frameworks. In most stories, therapists were constructed as 
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‘experts’ who are capable of dealing with shame by the use of the appropriate tools, 
but rather distanced from the relational part of the work (e.g. S. 3, S. 18, S. 10). 
Alternatively they were conceptualised as more ‘humane’ practitioners, but vulnerable 
and deskilled in relation to shame (e.g. S.17, S.23). Although in some stories (e.g. S. 
2) the therapist’s vulnerability was constructed in positive terms, in most narratives, 
‘vulnerability’ was almost incompatible with “experience”, “confidence” or expertise. 
It is worth considering that within the counselling psychology framework, ‘being in 
relation’ has historically sat in opposition with being an ‘expert’ (Strawbridge & 
Woolfe, 2010), which is a view that was reflected in this analysis.  
Overall, the discourse of a ‘hidden self’ was prevalent in most stories, with shame 
being constructed as a barrier for effective therapeutic work, as it is understood in most 
therapeutic paradigms (e.g. Rogers, 1961; Winnicott, 1965). In addition, it was 
suggested that within the discourse of expertise, shame seemed to be constructed as a 
manageable and recognisable object that can be described and scrutinised by the 
therapist (Foucault, 1972). On the other hand, within the discourse of ‘human 
practitioner’, it was understood as a dangerous, external object, with both the therapist 
and the client being powerless in relation to it. There were only a handful of stories 
whereby the therapists’ position moved between different subjectivities. It was argued 
that these stories reflect a flexibility between a “knowing and a not knowing” position, 
which could be seen as a middle ground between expertise and vulnerability (Mason, 
2005, p. 191). 
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4.6.1. Post- Data Analysis Reflexivity and Potential Influences of the Institutional 
Context 
Personal reflexivity forms an overarching principle of discourse analysis. In particular, 
throughout the analysis, researchers need to pay attention to their role in the generation 
of research data as well as its possible implications for their own subjectivity 
(Georgaka & Avdi, 2012). As mentioned earlier, at all stages of the analysis, I tried to 
maintain a constant awareness of the ways that participants’ narratives might have 
been influenced by my own assumptions about shame in the therapeutic framework. 
Indeed, in the previous sections, I argued that despite the anonymity of the task, 
participants’ responses were based on the idea that they would be read by a fellow 
practitioner. It was suggested that this made it more likely for them to draw on an 
expert discourse, by using specific therapeutic terms (e.g. transference) or referring to 
specific shame theories (e.g. self-conscious emotions). I contended that this positioned 
us within a group of ‘experts’ who have a certain level of ‘knowledge’ and experience 
in dealing with shame. Arguably, the ‘awareness’ that their answers would be read by 
another therapist becomes more evident in some stories whereby participants 
alternated between “I” and “Alex” (e.g. S. 10, S. 25) when describing the therapist in 
their stories, despite the instructions on completing the story.  
It is also worth reflecting on the ways that my own stance as a practitioner might have 
impacted the study, as well as participants’ responses. In particular, being part of a 
doctorate that values intersubjectivity (Milton, 2010), I probably started the research 
process having already constructed a therapist whose stance in relation to shame is 
based on humanistic values. My assumptions might have become more evident 
through the way I am describing the characters of in story-stem given to participants. 
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In particular, ‘Alex’ (the therapist) is conceptualised as “puzzled” and ‘Jo’ is referred 
to as “client” rather than ‘patient’: 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Story-stem: “Alex has recently started working therapeutically with a new client 
named Jo. In their second session, Alex is feeling rather puzzled. Jo seems to avoid 
eye contact and stops talking at various points during the session. Then Jo discloses 
feeling ashamed.” 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
The language used is likely to have ‘directed’ participants towards a more ‘vulnerable’ 
and ‘human’ conceptualisation of the therapist. Indeed, within the discursive 
framework, the discourses are understood as a co-construction between the researcher 
and the participant, whilst the researcher’s role is that of a “co-author”, rather than a 
“discoverer” (Willig, 2008, p. 126).  
Moreover, it could be argued that these instructions made it more likely for them to 
assume that, as a researcher, I am expecting them to construct a therapist who 
understands shame within a humanistic perspective. It is worth considering that within 
the counselling psychology framework, the alignment with a ‘humanistic’ discourse 
could be seen as a discursive action to maintain one’s credibility as a practitioner. 
Being based on humanistic values, counselling psychology is a field that was originally 
created as an alternative to mainstream psychological theories (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 
2010). Therefore, it could be expected that the participants in this study were more 
likely to draw on a humanistic discourse when constructing the therapist, as a way to 
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make the stories more ‘socially acceptable’ within a counselling psychology research 
framework.  
A dilemma that was faced during the writing up of the study was in regard to the 
therapist’s characteristics in the story-stem. Although my initial thoughts were to 
construct her as ‘female’, as I thought that there is a larger number of female therapists, 
following discussion with my supervisor it was decided to avoid offering a definite 
gender to the therapist, as a way to allow some ambiguity within the narrative (Clarke 
et al., 2017). Thus, the therapist and the client were given names that could be gender 
ambiguous (‘Alex’ and ‘Jo’) and participants had the freedom to construct their 
characters the way they wanted to. Even though there was some variation in the gender 
of the therapist, the client was constructed as female in most stories (in 34 out of 45 
stories). This could be attributed to the fact that ‘Jo’ is more often a female name. 
However, from a constructionist perspective, it could be argued that it is related to the 
qualities associated with shame in the study, namely “passivity”, “neediness” or 
“vulnerability”, which are more often constructed as female characteristics (Seu, 
2006).  
Overall, the analysis made me reconsider my own assumptions about shame and the 
possible ways of practising in relation to it. Throughout the analysis, I problematised 
the assumptions that several therapeutic approaches conceptualise as ‘truths’, along 
with the concept of ‘truth’ per se. Indeed, the participants’ stories demonstrated that 
the same situation can be managed in a variety of ways, whilst a particular reaction 
can be deemed as either appropriate or inappropriate, based on the theoretical angle 
we look at it from. For example, the therapist’s ‘vulnerability’ was constructed as a 
87 
 
positive element in stories that drew on a humanistic discourse or a ‘problem’ for 
participants who drew on a psychodynamic discourse.  
 
Having provided an overview of the main discursive themes, the available 
subjectivities in relation to shame and their action orientation, in the next chapter, I 
aim to discuss their relevance for therapeutic practice. I am also considering the 
limitations of the analysis and suggest possible ways they could be addressed in future 
studies.  
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5. REVIEW AND IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to explore therapeutic practitioners’ talk about shame. 
It utilised the theory and methods of FDA, as a way to consider the impact that the 
wider sociocultural context may have on participants’ discourses. In this chapter, I aim 
to evaluate the effectiveness of FDA as an analytic method, combined with ‘story-
completion’ tasks as a method of data collection, and consider the main discourses in 
the context of the research aims.  
Therefore, I start by revisiting the research questions and summarise the main 
analytical findings. In this section, I aim to demonstrate the relevance of the analysis 
to the therapeutic practice. I also consider the main discursive themes in relation to the 
wider literature, including previous relevant studies. In the second part, I aim to 
critically evaluate the study, in accordance with the quality criteria outlined in the 
‘methodology section’ and its epistemological assumptions. Finally, I discuss the 
study’s limitations and make suggestions for future studies. 
5.2. Research Summary 
To summarise, this study aimed to examine the different ways that therapeutic 
practitioners discoursed shame in the context of therapy through their stories. As 
mentioned in the methodology section and in line with Willig’s (2008) suggestions for 
FDA, the analysis was structured around three research questions: 
• What are the sociocultural discourses imbricated when constructing shame?  
• How is the therapist positioned in relation to shame in participants’ stories?  
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• What are the possible implications for therapeutic practice? 
 
5.2.1. Constructing Shame 
The questions were answered via close examination of the ways that shame was 
discoursed in participants’ stories. In particular, I presented a reading of the stories, 
suggesting that the way we understand therapeutic practice in relation to shame could 
be seen as socially constructed. In accordance with the Foucauldian theory (Arribas-
Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008), I argued that the stories, as conceptualised by practising 
therapists, legitimise different interventions in relation to shame, which, in turn, make 
available different ways of being in the therapy room. Indeed, within the discourse 
analytic framework, language is seen as constructive of social realities, rather than 
descriptive and thus, ‘action orientated’ (Burr, 2003; Willig, 2008). 
My interpretation of the data emphasised the centrality of the individual ‘self’ in 
therapists’ understanding of shame. Participants drew mainly on a humanistic or 
psychodynamic discourse, constructing shame around the concept of an internal, ‘true’ 
self, which is hidden behind shame-related behaviours. Alternatively, they drew on a 
positivist discourse, constructing it as a condition that could be ‘solved’ under the 
application of the appropriate therapeutic techniques. In particular, in most stories, 
shame was conceptualised as a barrier to effective therapeutic work-as it is understood 
in most therapeutic approaches, since it prevents the client from revealing themselves 
in therapy. At the same time, ‘uncovering’ shame was constructed as one of the aims 
of therapy. 
It was suggested that by discoursing shame as an individual, internalised problem, 
participants legitimised psychotherapy as an institution that re-produces the regulated, 
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inward-looking, autonomous selfhood (Georgaka & Avdi, 2009). On the other hand, 
shame-related behaviours, with their focus on others and the ‘passivity’ they can evoke 
(Seu, 2006) could be seen as opposite from the construct of the Western autonomous, 
regulated selfhood. By positioning the client as lacking these qualities, it could be 
argued that the therapist is given considerable authority, whereas the client is 
disempowered and in need of the therapist’s expertise, in order to find their own 
agency.  
Furthermore, it was contented that the construct of a client who is ‘shamed’ and not 
‘open’ about themselves in the therapy room goes against the construct of a typical 
therapeutic session, whereby the therapist is doing what they are trained to do – being 
offered a narrative and trying to make sense of it. Indeed, with a client who is not open 
about the ‘nature’ of their ‘problem’ the therapist is left clueless and potentially 
powerless, as they don’t know how to manage their distress. Hence, in most narratives, 
the therapist was constructed as working hard to make the client ‘open up’ and talk 
about their emotions, which was constructed as liberating and therapeutic for them. It 
was argued that therapists’ assumptions about what makes a therapeutic session 
‘successful’ can have an impact on the clients’ direction of change.  
5.2.2. Contested Subjectivities and Implications for Therapeutic Practice 
Based on an understanding of shame as problematic in the context of therapy, the 
therapists’ expertise was discoursed in various ways, depending on the theoretical 
framework participants drew on. For example, within the psychodynamic discourse, 
the therapist was positioned as accountable for ‘containing’ the client’s shame, whilst 
the client was constructed as a passive recipient of their expertise. Participants who 
drew on a cognitive-behavioural discourse focussed more on ‘psycho-education’ or 
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‘grounding techniques’, as a way to deal with it. It was suggested that by approaching 
shame in this way, they legitimised therapeutic work by constructing the therapist’s 
contribution as ‘necessary’ to help the client become more open and, ultimately, 
‘overcome’ their shame. It could be said that the discourse of therapist’s expertise 
made the Foucauldian notion of power-knowledge more evident in the data (Foucault, 
1972).  
Finally, it was suggested that the discourse of a practitioner who is more ‘humane’, 
rather than ‘expert’ provides an alternative subject position. In particular, in some 
stories, the therapist was constructed as ‘vulnerable’ and impacted by the intensity of 
shame and thus, not ‘reassured’ that they can deal with it. Therapists’ vulnerability, 
was constructed either as an impediment, or an invaluable tool for the ‘success’ of 
therapy, by enabling an ‘open’ discussion about shame. I argued that the variation in 
participants’ conceptualisations of therapists’ vulnerability indicates that there might 
be no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ way to deal with shame, since our understandings of 
therapeutic practice are socially constructed. At the end of the analysis, I 
acknowledged my own ‘embeddedness’ in a counselling psychology discourse that 
draws heavily on a humanistic value base and reflected on the impact of the research 
context on participants’ responses to my story-stem.  
 
5.3. Locating the Study in Relation to Previous Literature 
The discursive themes identified in this study share commonalities with previous 
literature. For example, the emphasis of therapeutic discourse on individual 
subjectivity and the privileging of self-sufficiency as a therapeutic ideal have been 
discussed by poststructural theorists in a variety of studies and theoretical papers (e.g. 
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Gergen, 1999; Guilfoyle, 2002; Sampson, 1989; 1993). Moreover, previous studies 
have explored the ways in which psychotherapy discourses construct the ‘ideal’ 
subjectivity, the ‘preferred’ direction of change (Burnman, 1992; Guilfoyle, 2005) or 
the sources of clients’ difficulties (Guilfoyle, 2002; Hook, 2001). Furthermore, Hare-
Mustin (1994) explored how the dominant discourses circulated in the therapy room 
reflect the prevailing ideologies in the society and pointed to the ways that a problem 
is re-formulated towards the therapist’s direction of change. Both these discursive 
themes were dominant in the present analysis, as well. 
The relationship between therapists’ ‘expertise’ and the operations of power in the 
therapy room is a central topic in Foucault’s theories (e.g. Foucault, 1980; 1982) and 
has been examined in several studies within the discourse analytic framework (e.g. 
Guilfoyle, 2005; Kogan, 1998; Madill & Doherty, 1994). In line with the findings of 
this thesis, researchers in the above studies demonstrated how the therapists’ 
interventions in relation to different conditions aim to pursue their agenda, which is 
accordant with the theoretical framework they are drawing upon and reflects culturally 
dominant discourses. As I discuss below, these findings, along with the Foucauldian 
theories emphasise the unavoidable relationship between power and knowledge in the 
therapy room and point to the need for therapists’ reflexivity in terms of how their 
personal values and theories can impact the clients’ subjectivities and their self-
narratives.  
According to my knowledge, this is the first study examining shame in the therapeutic 
context from a social constructionist perspective. Despite the increased interest of 
psychotherapy research in social constructionist approaches (Avdi & Georgaka, 2007), 
emotions, including shame, have received relatively little attention from this 
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perspective. As described in the ‘introduction’ section, most of the previous studies on 
shame have focussed on the ways it can impact therapeutic outcomes (e.g. Black, 
Curran & Dyer, 2013; Hook & Andrews, 2005; Swan & Andrews, 2003), utilising a 
realist epistemology, whilst only a few studies have examined its phenomenology and 
the ways it is experienced in the therapy room (e.g. Miller & Draghi-Lorenz, 2005; 
Petter, 2010). It could be argued that these studies are compatible with mainstream 
psychological theories and they enhance them by adding new evidence of their claims. 
However, they leave the assumptions that underlie therapeutic practice 
unproblematised, as the client’s direction of change and/or the role of the therapist are 
taken-for-granted. 
Moreover, this is the first study that takes into account the complex interplay between 
the individual and the society in our understandings of shame and addresses issues of 
power. Due to the differences in their epistemological perspectives, it is rather difficult 
to compare the results of this research with previous studies on shame. Nevertheless, 
it could be said that the need to ‘understand’, ‘acknowledge’ and ‘monitor’ shame was 
a common discursive theme in most studies (e.g. Kramer et al., 2018; Miller & Draghi-
Lorenz, 2005; Petter, 2010) including the present one. In accordance with the results 
of this research and the mainstream therapeutic theories, the discourse of ‘progressing’ 
through shame was dominant in most accounts (e.g. Kramer et al., 2018; Swan & 
Andrews, 2003). However, from a poststructuralist perspective, the need to overcome 
shame is more likely to be seen as reproducing dominant cultural values in relation to 
‘recovery’ or the therapist’s institutional role, rather than a universal therapeutic goal 
(Georgaka, 2012). Therefore, despite the commonalities, the results of this study are 
not necessarily comparable with previous ones, as they approach therapeutic practice 
through different lens.   
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5.4. Study’s Contributions to Therapeutic Practice 
Within the discourse analytic framework, the concepts of research or practice 
‘implications’ are rather contested. In particular, Willig (1998) suggested that 
discourse analytic research could provide a useful tool to examine taken-for-granted 
assumptions in relation to therapeutic practice and make recommendations for 
alternative ways of practising. However, postmodern theorists, including Foucault 
(1981) argued that recommendations could make researchers commit to prescriptive 
discourses and impose categories upon others (Widdicombe, 1995). Hence, rather than 
make recommendations, in this section, I aim to contextualise the analysis in relation 
to therapeutic practice and demonstrate its usefulness for the readers, as this study is 
part of a ‘professional’ doctorate. 
The purpose of the study, as discussed in the introduction, was to problematise 
therapeutic practitioners in terms of their practices in relation to shame and emphasise 
the therapist’s contribution in the client’s direction of change. By analysing practicing 
therapists’ narratives with regard to shame, I tried to highlight some of the hegemonic 
discourses about therapeutic practice and the ways they are reproduced and maintained 
through the therapeutic discourse. 
The analysis elucidated some of the mechanisms through which a particular set of 
shame-related behaviours is transformed into a ‘psychological object’, which can be 
dealt with through the application of the appropriate therapeutic knowledge. It was 
argued that the discourse of shame, as related to psychological difficulties, is 
inextricably linked to the Western ideals of the modern, self-contained self. Although 
shame is not considered a psychological disorder, it was suggested that shame-related 
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behaviours prevent an individual from behaving in accordance with the ideals of 
modernity, such as self-agency and autonomy, which are echoed in psychotherapy.  
The ‘relativity’ of what is discoursed as ‘healthy’ behaviour or ‘good therapeutic 
practice’ suggests a need to critically reflect on the discursive themes that are 
reproduced in therapeutic practice. Indeed, through the analysis, I tried to point to the 
risks involved if therapy fails to acknowledge the influence of dominant discourses, 
regarding, for example, ‘self-sufficiency’ or ‘openness’, whereby the practitioner’s 
assumptions are thought to be universal and are imposed on the therapeutic dialogue 
(Avdi & Georgaka, 2007). 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is acknowledged that the analysis provides 
one of the many possible ways to read the data. Therefore, the aim of this thesis was 
not to produce generalisable results or change the dominant ways of talking and 
dealing with shame. However, a critical awareness of the ways that institutional power 
might be played out in the therapeutic dynamics could help therapeutic practitioners 
make more informed choices on how to work with their clients. In accordance with 
Foucault’s theory (Foucault, 1972), it is suggested that ‘power’ cannot be taken away, 
or given to someone. Nevertheless, by making more informed choices and being more 
aware of the ways it is played out in the room, therapists can choose not to work in 
ways which can be seen as ‘disempowering’ for their clients.  
The different subjectivities identified in the stories emphasised the movement between 
different ways of being, in relation to shame as a discursive object. Thus, the subject 
positions of the ‘expert’ and the ‘humane’ therapist were present in most stories, 
illustrating different ways of professionally positioning oneself in the therapy room. It 
could be argued that through their stories, participants constructed a negotiation 
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between an effort to maintain a professional, ‘expert’ position and, in a way, protect 
oneself from the overwhelming experience of dealing with shame. Alternatively, the 
therapist was constructed in more ‘humane’ terms reflecting an effort to resist the 
prevailing, but reductive discourse of ‘expertise’ as well as a tension between a 
‘knowing’ and a ‘being’ way of understanding shame. It is suggested that these 
positions could be deployed in a variety of contexts and applied to issues other than 
shame. Indeed, these positions could be seen as polarised ways of understanding one’s 
accounts of therapeutic practice. It is acknowledged that one can flexibly move 
between two subject positions (Foucault, 1982), which is what probably happens to 
most therapeutic practitioners. Indeed, it has been argued that in order to remain 
receptive to different meanings and possibilities, therapists need to become less certain 
of the positions they hold (Mason, 1993). By being more flexible, they can be more 
receptive to the influence of other perspectives and the different meanings the clients 
might put on events, whilst maintaining their professional stance (Mason, 2005). It has 
also been contented that therapists’ flexibility and ability to move between the 
positions of a ‘knowing expert’ and a ‘not-knowing, non-expert’ can have a positive 
impact on the therapeutic relationship (Roy-Chowdhury, 2006). 
In terms of counselling psychology practice, it could be suggested that the 
heterogeneity of the subject positions discoursed in the analysis reflects the multiple 
and often conflicting expert knowledges that counselling psychologists have to 
negotiate when dealing with emotions in the therapy room. Drawing on an integrative 
or pluralistic framework, counselling psychologists utilise a variety of theoretical 
perspectives (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010) that often contradict each other in terms 
of their epistemological assumptions. Besides, being part of a multidisciplinary team, 
means being able to ‘discuss’ therapeutic knowledge in a variety of ways, drawing 
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both on an ‘expert’ and a more ‘humane’ discourse. It can also be argued that despite 
the division’s reflexive stance towards power in the therapy room (BPS, 2017a), 
therapeutic paradigms that fit the deconstruction of emotion and power in the therapy 
room are less mainstream within this framework. Systemic and/or narrative 
approaches, for example, do not form part of the teaching curricula in counselling 
psychology training courses and most of the mainstream counselling psychology 
textbooks do not refer to them (e.g. Galbraith, 2017; Milton, 2010). Therefore, it could 
be said that this study aimed to contribute to an alternative ‘evidence-base’ and make 
counselling psychology practitioners and supervisors more sceptical towards the ways 
they frame their clients’ emotions and the wider discourses they draw upon when 
dealing with shame.  
In summary, in this research, I aimed to emphasise some of the ways in which 
therapists can bring unacknowledged assumptions about ‘problematic’ emotions and 
subjectivities, which are drawn from broader therapeutic or societal discourses. In 
contrast to the previous studies on shame that focussed solely on therapy as an 
intrapersonal or interpersonal process, this study approached it as an institution, that 
legitimises specific forms of subjectivity and knowledge. By being aware of these 
processes, therapists can be more reflexive and critical of the therapeutic and social 
discourses they draw upon and impose on their clients (Avdi & Georgaka, 2007). 
Attending to these issues can help them adopt a more informed and ethical position 
towards their practice.  
5.5. Evaluation of the Study 
Overall, this study aimed to present a social constructionist reading of the data 
collected from 45 participants’ stories. As mentioned in the ‘methodology’ section, 
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throughout the analysis and the presentation of data, I tried to comply with Henwood 
& Pidgeon’s (1992) criteria and Willig’s (2008) suggestions in order to ensure the 
quality of my research, in accordance with qualitative criteria.6 In this section, I aim 
to provide a post-analysis evaluation of story-completion tasks as applied in a 
poststructuralist-discursive framework, reflect on the limitations of the study and 
provide some research suggestions, as a way to expand our understanding of shame.  
5.5.1. Story Completion as a Method of Data Collection 
This study utilised ‘story-completion tasks’, which is a rather novel method of data 
collection. The rationale for its use was that in previous studies (e.g. Livingston & 
Farber, 1996, p. 608; Miller & Draghi-Lorenz, 2005), researchers noticed that 
participants struggled to talk about shame and noted that “shame tends to breed shame” 
(p. 608). It was therefore thought that third person accounts could offer a way to engage 
therapists from a variety of backgrounds to talk about shame more ‘freely’, as they 
would not have to ‘own’ their perspectives (Clark et al., 2017). 
As expected, participants’ stories provided data, which were ‘rich’ enough to see some 
patterns and conduct analysis from a Foucauldian perspective. However, it could be 
argued that despite the initial purpose of the story-completion method to “slightly 
remove them” from the topic (Clarke et al., 2017, p. 49), most participants were rather 
involved and identified with the role of the therapist, presumably because of their 
personal experiences of dealing with similar topics, as they were practicing therapists. 
It could still be suggested, though, that this design gave them more freedom and control 
in terms of using the story-stem as a way to write about personal experiences of dealing 
 
6 Please see ‘methodology’ section for more information on how I tried to comply with Henwood & Pidgeon’s 
(1992) criteria. 
99 
 
with shame or not. On the contrary, in an interview situation they would probably have 
to ‘own’ their perspectives. Participants who completed the pilot stories as part of the 
study, reported that the process of writing up the story made them reflect on their 
practice in relation to shame, whilst one of them said that she wrote about a ‘real’ 
scenario she had experienced in her practice. As discussed in the analysis, the 
identification with the therapist’s role became more evident in stories whereby 
participants started by expressing their views on the topic or used a first-person 
pronoun. Since the aim was not to discover any type of truth in their stories, this was 
not a problem for this study.  
Overall, it could be argued that participants in this study played a rather diverse role, 
as they had to draw and reflect both on their personal practices and the broader 
theoretical discourses, whilst talking about imaginary characters. Compared to 
previous studies that have used this method (e.g. Walsh & Malson, 2010), participants 
in this research were more likely to have found themselves in a scenario similar to the 
one described in the story stem. Moreover, they were aware that their stories would be 
read by a fellow ‘expert’ in this area. These issues might have impacted their 
motivation to write the story stem, as well as its structure and/or length. That is, they 
might have put extra effort to prove their expertise or their interest in the topic. 
To the best of my knowledge, there is only one study that has previously utilised story 
completion within a post-structuralist analytic framework (Walsh & Malson, 2010). 
Similarly to the researchers’ reflections (Braun et al., 2019), in this research, story 
completion produced a dataset which was suitable for a meaningful analysis of this 
type. In particular, participants’ stories seemed to draw on various discourses, 
constructing different versions of ‘realities’ in relation to shame and the therapeutic 
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practice. It could be argued that the concept of an ‘imagined’, instead of a ‘real’ 
therapeutic situation probably provided a good way to examine the power dynamics, 
as participants did not have to ‘own’ their perspectives, so they were more free to 
reflect on the subject positions that become available in the scenario they were given. 
Nevertheless, as described earlier, it seemed that most of them identified with the role 
of the therapist. From a more personal perspective, it was felt that the anonymity of 
the task, along with the third person accounts was among the strengths of this method 
as it helped me ‘distance myself’ from participants’ discourses and attend to them 
through a more critical gaze, approaching them more as socially constructed, 
prevailing discourses, rather than personal experiences.  
The average story was about 400 words, although the sizes of the stories ranged from 
74 to 726 words in length. The absence of specific guidelines in relation to the number 
of participants or the amount of data that could be seen as ‘enough’ for a doctoral level 
study could be seen as a limitation of story completion. Yet, it might be argued that 
the flexibility of this method leaves more to the researcher’s ‘judgement’, which in 
turn allows more room for the complexity to emerge. Based on these issues, it was 
thought that 45 stories of the above length provided a dataset which was suitable for 
meaningful analysis from a poststructuralist perspective, as it was felt that no new 
discursive patterns were emerging from the stories. 
Overall, it is suggested that story completion can be a useful method for counselling 
psychology research, as it provides theoretical flexibility and can support the 
implementation of studies from a variety of epistemological paradigms, in accordance 
with the discipline’s pluralistic viewpoint (BPS, 2017a). Furthermore, most 
therapeutic practitioners are familiar with the use of scenarios or vignettes and thus, it 
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can provide a useful alternative to interviews in qualitative study designs (Milton, 
2010; Shah-Beckley, 2017). Finally, it could be argued that story completion provides 
a good way to examine power relations, as participants do not have to position 
themselves within the discourse. This might help them write more freely about their 
understandings of particular phenomena and their impact on subjectivity and practice.  
5.5.2. Limitations of the Study 
One of the most common critiques on deconstructionist forms of discourse analysis is 
that they are rather ‘removed’ from the therapeutic thinking and the experiences or 
difficulties practitioners deal with in their practice (Georgaka & Avdi, 2007). Indeed, 
FDA is the most ‘macro-form’ of discourse analysis and aims to problematise current 
practices and attend to the power struggles (Arribas-Aylon & Walkerdine, 2008). 
However, it has been argued that its focus stays on a ‘surface level’, rather than going 
into more depth and explain the reasons why certain practices are taking place. 
Although researchers may identify the subject positions occupied in a particular 
context, this form of analysis fails to explain why individuals may stay in subject 
positions, which can be ‘limiting’ (Willig, 2008). It should be noted that it was beyond 
the scope of this study to attend to the motives of people in relation to the discourses 
they draw upon or the subject positions they construct through their stories. 
Nevertheless, in the following sections, I suggest ways these could be explored in 
future studies, in order to enhance our current thinking about emotions.  
It could also be said that for an ‘emotive’ subject, such as shame, this form of analysis, 
with its emphasis on meaning and language, has almost ‘neglected’ or undermined the 
potentially difficult and embodied experience of shame for the clients or the therapists 
dealing with it (Nightingale & Cromby, 1999). Besides, it has been argued that 
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findings of discourse analytic studies can be difficult to be directly applied to everyday, 
clinical practice (Avdi & Georgaka, 2007). Nevertheless, in accordance with a 
poststructuralist framework, the scope of this study was to provide a critical reading 
of discourses on shame, rather than explore its ‘nature’ or the clinicians’ experience of 
dealing with it. In addition, it was thought that these issues have been well-researched 
in previous studies (e.g. Kramer et al., 2018; Miller & Draghi-Lorenz, 2005; Petter, 
2010) and thus a poststructuralist reading would provide clinicians the opportunity to 
reflect on their stance towards more dominant shame discourses.  
As mentioned earlier, it is acknowledged that the analysis provides only a possible 
reading of the data. The extracts selected from the stories were chosen on the basis of 
better demonstrating the arguments I wanted to make and ensuring the coherence and 
plausibility of the analysis (Parker, 1992). It has been argued that the selection of texts 
on the basis of constructing a particular version of reality can be an issue in discourse 
analysis (Avdi & Georgaka, 2007, Willig, 2008). Nonetheless, it could be said that it 
is up to the reader to decide if the presentation of the data provides a sufficiently 
coherent and compelling argument (Willig, 2008), especially since it is not claimed 
that the study represents any form of ‘truth’.  
In a similar vein, within discourse analysis, the researcher cannot be located outside 
the discourse. As discussed in the analysis section, participants’ stories could be seen 
as a co-construction, that privileges a particular version of knowledge. In order to deal 
with this issue, I have reflected on my own views on therapeutic practice, as well as 
my ‘embeddedness’ in a doctorate that values humanistic ideals (Strawbridge & 
Woolfe, 2010). Although it is acknowledged that participants’ stories will have 
inevitably been shaped by the discursive context of the study (Parker, 1999), it is hoped 
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that my awareness of these issues will not limit the ‘credibility’ of the study (Willig, 
2008). 
Finally, from an ethical perspective, one could reflect on the problem of participants’ 
‘agency’. Indeed, participants’ lack of agency has been described as a limitation in 
most forms of discourse analysis, as they attempt a ‘theory-driven’ reading of the data, 
which does not take what participants say at face value (Willig, 2012). Arguably, the 
analysis of participants’ language runs the risk of presenting participants as 
constructing a phenomenon in particular ways, when this has not been their intention 
at the time they were writing up their stories. In order to deal with that, I tried to be as 
tentative as possible in my interpretation of participants’ discourses and constantly 
mindful of the effects that the analysis might have on them if they read it. Throughout 
the analysis, it was also acknowledged that the current reading presents only a possible 
way to understand the data, which has been influenced by my own views on the topic. 
Finally, it is important to reiterate that any critique made to participants’ claims as 
constructed in their stories aimed at a reification of shame-related practices within the 
wider institutional framework, rather than the individual therapists or their ways of 
constructing shame. 
 
5.6. Research Contributions and Directions for Future Research within the 
Counselling Psychology Framework 
Despite an increase in discourse analytic and social constructionist studies, discourse 
analysis is a rather underutilised method in counselling psychology (Lester, Wong, O’ 
Reilly & Kiyimba, 2018). In this section, I aim to explore how this study relates to 
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counselling psychology philosophy and values and discuss how the study of shame 
and other emotions can be informed by future research.  
Overall, discourse analytic studies do not aim to change the existing policies. 
However, they can help clinicians, problematise the role of power in shaping them and 
promote a new understanding of therapy, as “jointly managed in the interaction 
between client and therapist” (Georgaka, 2012, p. 162). In accordance with these 
views, this thesis tried to elucidate the ‘ways of being’ or the subject positions that 
become available in relation to shame. As mentioned in the ‘limitations’ section, it was 
beyond the scope of the study to examine the ‘motives’ of the people that inhabit these 
subject positions. Nevertheless, this could be further researched within this framework 
through a different form of discourse analysis. For example, researchers could use 
transcribed therapy sessions and trace shame through naturally occurring talk between 
the therapist and the client. The transcripts could then be analysed through 
‘conversation analysis’ or another form of micro-analysis that would trace the 
linguistic strategies through which therapists deal with shame. Compared to this study, 
most forms of micro-level discourse analysis try to illustrate the linguistic phenomena 
that take place in the therapy session, without questioning therapeutic assumptions that 
underlie them (Avdi & Georgaka, 2007). Therefore, by utilising a micro-level analysis 
researchers could focus on the content of the talk, rather than the broader discourses 
and explore the moment-to-moment interactions within a therapeutic session. This 
might help them understand the reasons why therapists or clients might position 
themselves in particular ways in relation to shame. Such research could promote 
practitioners’ reflexivity towards their interventions by enhancing our understanding 
of therapeutic practice in discursive terms. Moreover, micro-forms of discourse 
analysis do not necessarily adopt a social constructionist perspective. Therefore, the 
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therapeutic processes could be analysed through a different theoretical lens, such as 
psychodynamic theory. Indeed, it has been suggested that psychodynamic concepts, 
such as ‘projections’ or ‘defences’ could be utilised to account for the motives of 
people who occupy particular positions or their emotional investments in discourses 
(Hollway, 1989; Willig, 2008).  
Micro-level forms of discourse analysis have been criticised for focusing primarily on 
the production of discourse and neglecting the power dynamics or the institutional 
context in which it is taking place (Edwards, Ashmore & Potter, 1995; Georgaka & 
Avdi, 2009). In order to address this, researchers could utilise other methods, such as 
critical discourse analysis and attend both to the content of the therapeutic interaction 
and the wider social context that might interfere with the production of shame 
discourse (Wetherell, 1998). This type of research could also bridge the gap between 
macro and micro forms of discourse analysis (Avdi & Georgaka, 2007). Alternatively, 
researchers could utilise this method and analyse clients’, instead of therapists’ talk 
about shame, in order to gain an understanding from a different perspective. 
In conclusion, this study aimed to fill in the gap of previous studies that have examined 
shame as either an individual (e.g. Kramer et al., 2018) or interpersonal phenomenon 
(e.g. Petter 2010) by paying attention to the sociocultural context in which shame 
discourses are being produced. Through the analysis, I tried to reflect on the power 
dynamics as they are played out in the therapy room and problematise the ways they 
might be concealed in clinical practice. As discussed in the introduction, in its practice 
guidelines, the HCPC emphasises the importance of paying attention to the power 
dynamics created by the deployment of expert knowledge (HCPC, 2016). Further, the 
BPS Code of Ethics and Conduct mentions that “not all clients are powerless but many 
106 
 
are disadvantaged by lack of knowledge and certainty compared to the psychologist 
whose judgment they require” (BPS, 2018, p. 5). These statements indicate the 
importance of examining the power relations, or at least taking them into account when 
conducting research within the counselling psychology framework. Finally, despite 
being a rather epistemologically diverse field, counselling psychology follows the 
scientist practitioner model, which relies on ‘evidence-based’ practice and can be seen 
as reinforcing social norms in relation to expertise (Bury & Strauss, 2006; Strawbridge 
& Woolfe, 2010). It is suggested that counselling psychology research needs to 
maintain a critically reflective stance towards expert knowledges (Gergen, 1999) and 
produce research that acknowledges the formative and normative aspects of clinical 
practice in relation to emotions. 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
In this thesis, it was suggested that emotions, including shame, are socially 
constructed. This view opposes dominant theories that see them as naturally occurring 
phenomena, which can be understood or treated through the application of particular 
expert knowledges. 
Arguably, in therapeutic talk, shame-related behaviours were constructed as the 
opposite of the ideals of ‘openness’ and ‘self-sufficiency’ and thus, rather problematic 
for individuals. The analysis, indicated that these conceptualisations legitimise certain 
therapeutic practices. Based on an understanding of shame as related to lack of 
openness or passivity, the therapists’ interventions aimed to make the clients more 
open about their feelings and elicit emotions talk during the therapy session in some 
stories. In others, the therapist was constructed as ‘psychoeducating’ the client about 
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alternative, ‘healthier’ ways of being. In these discourses, the role of the therapist was 
conceptualised as necessary in promoting clients’ change towards a more socially 
acceptable direction. It was argued that the therapist was given considerable power in 
these discourses. However, for some clients these practices can be disempowering, as 
they are positioning them ‘in need’ of the therapist’s guidance, even if this is not the 
intention of the therapist. 
Overall, this study suggested that practitioners need to be more sceptical towards 
taken-for-granted values of psychotherapy, such as the therapist’s ‘expertise’, as well 
as the ways that dominant psychological theories may conceal power struggles within 
the therapy room. In order to practice in a reflective way, they need to be mindful of 
the historical and cultural constructions of phenomena, such as emotions, that are 
understood as occurring ‘naturally’ in mainstream theories.  
In accordance with Foucault’s ideas, this research emphasised that power cannot be 
taken away from the therapist or ‘given’ to someone. Besides, in his later writings, 
Foucault had reiterated that he saw “nothing wrong in the practice of a person who, 
knowing more than others in a specific game of truth, tells those others what to do, 
teaches them, and transmits knowledge and techniques to them” (Foucault, 1980, 
quoted in Fish, 1999, p. 67). Nevertheless, in order to practice in an ethical way, it is 
imperative that therapists are aware of the ways that power dynamics operate in the 
therapy room. 
In line with the Foucauldian stance, this study tried to adopt a critical position towards 
the contemporary ways of understanding and dealing with shame. In particular, it 
attempted to demonstrate that “things are not as self-evident as one believed” 
(Foucault, 1989, quoted in Margolin, 2017, p. 154). In conclusion, it is argued that 
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therapists should aim to develop the skills, the ethos and the vigilance to make the 
effects of power more reasonable and transparent, rather than try to eliminate it. 
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7. APPENDICES 
 
7.1. Appendix 1-Participants’ Information Sheet and Consent Form 
 
Participants’ Information Sheet 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of the study is to explore how therapeutic practitioners understand and 
discuss shame. In particular, I am interested in how therapists talk about the 
emergence of shame through their stories and how they conceptualise its impact on 
the therapeutic process.    
 
What will I have to do? 
If you agree to take part, you will be asked to complete a 'story completion task', 
describing a therapist dealing with a client’s shame. This means that you read the 
opening sentences of a story and then comment on what is going on, what happens 
next and how shame impacts the therapist, the client and the therapeutic process, in 
general. 
There is no right way to complete the story, and you can be as creative and 
imaginative as you like. In fact, I am interested in the variety of different stories 
participants may say and how they reflect on shame and its emergence in the 
therapeutic process. As I am focusing on how participants understand shame, please 
be as detailed as possible about the characters, the session and the interactions 
between them. Your story can unfold into the next sessions and beyond. 
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As you will see, some details of the opening sentences of the story are deliberately 
vague; it’s up to you to be creative and fill in the gaps of the story. 
What will my involvement require? 
Your involvement will be for the duration of the story completion, which will last 
between 10-30 minutes, although this depends on your pace, interest and depth of 
elaboration. 
If you agree to take part, I will then ask you to tick a box to confirm that you agree 
on a consent form. You can keep an electronic copy of the consent form. The overall 
research will last approximately 18 months. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
By taking part you will get the chance to participate in a study that uses an 
innovative method that will make you reflect on your own attitudes towards shame, 
as well as the ways you may frame your client’s distress. 
Apart from that, will have the opportunity to be part of a study that aims to contribute 
to a deeper understanding of shame and promote a scepticism towards current 
practices of dealing with clients’ distress in the therapy room. This can benefit the 
development of clinical practice and supervision by providing more tools to 
supervisors on how to work with supervisees dealing with shame. 
 
Why have I been invited to take part in the study? 
You have been invited to take part in this study because you are a practitioner 
working therapeutically with clients. 
It is anticipated that 45 participants from different parts of the world will take part in 
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this study. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No, you do not have to participate. There will be no adverse consequences to you in 
terms of your legal or other rights if you decide not to participate or withdraw at a 
later stage. You can withdraw your participation at any time before 20/5/19. If you 
wish to withdraw please contact me using the email address provided below. In order 
to identify your data, you will need to provide me with your research ID, so please 
make a note of it whilst you are completing the study. 
If you withdraw from the study this will mean that your participation and identifiable 
data already collected would be withdrawn from the study. No further data would be 
collected or any other research procedures would be carried out on or in relation to 
you. 
 
 What will happen to the data that I provide? 
The data you provide will be anonymised and any personal data (i.e your email 
address) will be stored securely, separately from those anonymised data. You will 
not be identified in any reports/publications resulting from this research and those 
reading them will not know who has contributed to it. With your permission, I would 
like to use anonymous quotations in reports, so please click the box on the next page 
if you agree on that. 
Anonymous research data derived from the stories will be stored securely for at least 
10 years following their last access and project data (related to the administration of 
the project, e.g. your consent form) for at least 6 years in line with the University of 
Surrey policies. 
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Personal data will be handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). In 
addition, and without prejudice to your rights at law, none of your personal data will 
be shared. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages or risks of taking part? 
There are no anticipated risks or disadvantages of participating in this research. 
However, as different people respond differently when asked to reflect on their 
understandings of particular emotions or situations, there is always the possibility for 
research participation of this type to raise uncomfortable and distressing issues. 
If you have any particular concerns about this project please contact me or my 
supervisor in the details provided at the end of this form. 
 
What happens when the research study stops? 
If you wish to do so, you may request a summary of the research findings. There is 
also the potential for the research findings to be published in peer-reviewed journals 
and may be presented by the researcher at professional conferences. The research 
project, when completed, will contribute towards the researcher’s qualification in the 
doctorate programme, PsychD, at the University of Surrey. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint or concern about any aspect of the way you have been dealt with 
during the course of the study will be addressed; please contact my supervisor, Dr 
Thomas Kent, whose details are set out below. 
If you are harmed by taking part in this research project, there are no special 
compensation arrangements.  If you are harmed due to someone's negligence, then 
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you may have grounds for legal action.  Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, 
or have any concerns about any aspect of the way you have been treated during the 
course of this study then you should follow the instructions given above. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Your details will be held in complete confidence and we will follow the ethical and 
legal practice in relation to all study procedures. Personal data name, contact details, 
audio recordings will be handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 so 
that unauthorised individuals will not have access to them. 
Your data will be accessed, processed and securely destroyed by the researcher and 
supervisor. In order to check that this research is carried out in line with the law and 
good research practice, monitoring and auditing can be carried out by independent 
authorised individuals. Data collected during the study may be looked at by 
authorised individuals from the University of Surrey, from regulatory authorities, 
where it is relevant to your taking part in this research. All will have a duty of 
confidentiality to you as a participant and we will do our best to meet this duty. 
In certain exceptional circumstances where you or others may be at significant risk of 
harm, the researcher may need to report this to an appropriate authority, in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. This would usually be discussed with 
you first. 
Examples of those exceptional circumstances when confidential information may 
have to be disclosed are: 
 
-              The researcher believes you are at serious risk of harm, either from yourself 
or others 
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-              The researcher suspects a child may be at risk of harm 
-              You pose a serious risk of harm to, or threaten or abuse others 
-              As a statutory requirement e.g. reporting certain infectious diseases 
-              Under a court order requiring the University to divulge information 
-              We are passed information relating to an act of terrorism. 
  
Full contact details of researcher and supervisor 
Researcher: Eugenia Drini, PsychD Student, Psychotherapeutic and Counselling 
Psychology, School of Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey GU2 
7XH. Email: e.drini-papagianopoulou@surrey.ac.uk. 
Supervisor: Dr Thomas Kent, Teaching Fellow, Psychotherapeutic and Counselling 
Psychology, School of Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey GU2 
7XH. Email: t.kent@surrey.ac.uk. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This research is organised by the University of Surrey, pursuant to the practitioner 
doctorate course in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology, School of 
Psychology. This research is being conducted by the researcher pursuant to her 
doctoral thesis of the aforementioned course. It is not funded. 
 
Who has reviewed the project? 
This research has been looked at by an independent group of people, called an Ethics 
Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed by and received a 
favourable ethical opinion from the Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of 
Health and Medical Sciences, School of Psychology, University of Surrey. 
Consent Form 
Having read the information in the previous section, I confirm that: 
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• I have understood all the Information provided.  I have been given a full explanation 
by the researchers of the nature, purpose, location and likely duration of the study, and 
of what I will be expected to do.    
• I understand that in accordance with the English law, insurance is in place which 
covers harm that is likely to result from my participation in this study as detailed in 
the participant information sheet.                                                                                   
• I agree for my anonymised data to be used for this study that will have received all 
relevant legal, professional and ethical approvals. 
 • I give consent to anonymous verbatim quotation being used in reports.  
• I understand that all project data will be held for at least 6 years and all research data 
for at least 10 years in accordance with University policy and  
• I understand that my personal data is held and processed in the strictest confidence, 
and in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998).                                            
• I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study without needing to justify my 
decision, without prejudice and without my legal rights and studies/employment being 
affected.   
• I understand that I can request for my data to be withdrawn until 20/5/2019 and that 
following my request personal data already collected from me will be destroyed.             
• I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to participate 
in this study.  I have been given adequate time to consider my participation. 
I consent, begin the study 
I do not consent, I do not wish to participate 
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7.2. Appendix 2-Study Advert 
 
 
 
Dear all 
 
 
I am a trainee counselling psychologist at Surrey University. 
I am at the final stages of my training and I am currently looking 
for therapeutic practitioners (i.e. psychotherapists, psychologists or 
psychiatrists) who are willing to take part in an online qualitative project 
about the impact of shame on the therapeutic practice. 
If you decide to participate you will be asked to read a story-stem and 
complete the rest of the story online. Your contribution will be 
important for the completion of the study and you will have the 
chance to reflect on your own ways of dealing with shame. 
The study has gained ethical approval from the University of 
Surrey Ethics Committee. 
 
 
For more information or to participate, please follow the link below: 
https://surreyfahs.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bw2Eu4b7uiD5Bxr 
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Thank you for your valuable help! 
 
 
Eugenia Drini 
Trainee Counselling 
Psychologist Surrey University 
Email: e.drini-papagianopoulou@surrey.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
7.3. Appendix 3- Letter of Ethical Approval and Notification of Amendments 
 
Ethical Approval Letter 
Chair’s Action 
 
Proposal Ref:   
 
1380-PSY-18 
Name of 
Student/Trainee:  
 
EVGENIA DRINI 
Title of Project: Therapists’ discursive constructions of 
shame within the therapeutic process. A 
story completion task 
  
Supervisor: Dr Elena Manafi, Dr Christina Harnegea 
  
Date of submission: 
 
Date of confirmation 
email: 
13th April 2018 
 
 
05th June 2018 
  
  
The above Research Project has been submitted to the Faculty of Health and 
Medical Sciences Ethics Committee and has received a favourable ethical opinion 
with minor conditions. Confirmation has been received that the conditions stipulated 
after ethical review have now been addressed and compliance with these conditions 
have been documented. 
 
The final list of revised documents reviewed by the Committee is as follows: 
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Ethics Application Form 
Detailed Protocol for the project 
Participant Information sheet 
Consent Form 
Recruitment advertisement/email 
Risk Assessment (If appropriate) 
Insurance Documentation (If appropriate) 
 
 
 
All documentation from this project should be retained by the student/trainee in case 
they are notified and asked to submit their dissertation for an audit. 
 
      
Signed and Dated: _05/06/2018________________ 
                                   Professor Bertram Opitz 
                               Co-Chair, Ethics Committee  
 
Please note: 
If there are any significant changes to your proposal which require further scrutiny, please 
contact the Faculty of Health and Medical Sciences Ethics Committee before proceeding 
with your Project. 
 
 
Notification of Amendments 
 
 
 
FHMS Chair’s Action Notification of Amendment 
 
 
 
Reference 1380-PSY-18 
138 
 
Name of student EVGENIA DRINI 
Title of Project Therapists’ discursive constructions 
of shame within the therapeutic 
process. A story completion task 
Supervisor Dr Thomas Kent 
Date of Submission of original proposal 13th April 2018 
Date of FEO being granted 05th June 2018 
Date of submission of proposed amendment 15th April 2019 
Date of FEO for Amendment 26th April 2019 
 
 
A Notification of Amendment for the above Research Project has been submitted to the 
Faculty of Health and Medical Sciences Ethics Committee and has received a favourable 
ethical opinion on the basis described in the protocol and supporting documentation. 
 
 
The final list of documents reviewed by the Committee may include: 
Notification of Amendment Form 
Detailed Protocol for the project 
 
 
 
All documentation from this project should be retained by the student/trainee in case they 
are notified and asked to submit their dissertation for an audit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Professor Bertram Opitz, Co-Chair, FHMS Ethics Committee 
 
Research Insurance Certificate 
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7.4. Appendix 4-Extracts from the Analysis 
 
 
To Whom It May Concern 
 
 
Our ref: TK/IND 19 July, 2018 
 
Zurich Municipal Customer: University of Surrey and Wholly-Owned 
Subsidiary Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zurich Municipal 
Zurich House 
1 Gladiator Way 
Farnborough 
Hampshire 
GU14 6GB 
 
Telephone: 0800 335500 
E-mail: nicola.pilsbury@uk.zurich.com 
 
Zurich Municipal 
Zurich Municipal is a trading name 
Zurich Insurance plc 
A public limited company incorporated 
in Ireland Registration No. 13460 
 
Registered Office: Zurich House, 
Ballsbridge Park, Dublin 4, Ireland. 
UK Branch registered in England and 
Wales Registration No. BR7985. 
UK Branch Head Office: The Zurich 
Centre, 3000 Parkway, Whiteley, 
Fareham, Hampshire PO15 7JZ. 
 
Zurich Insurance plc is authorised by 
the Central Bank of Ireland and 
authorised and subject to limited 
regulation by the Financial Conduct 
Authority. Details about the extent of 
our authorisation by the Financial 
Conduct Authority are available from 
us on request. Our FCA Firm 
Reference Number is 203093. 
This is to confirm that University of Surrey and Wholly-Owned Subsidiary 
Companies has in force with this Company until the policy expiry on 
31 July 2019 Insurance incorporating the following essential features: 
Policy Number: NHE-17CA01-0013 
Limit of Indemnity: 
Public Liability: £ 35,000,000 any one event 
Products Liability: £ 35,000,000 for all claims in the 
Pollution:  aggregate during 
any one period of 
insurance 
 
Employers’ Liability: £ 35,000,000 any one event 
inclusive of costs 
 
Excess: 
Public Liability/Products Liability/Pollution: £250 any one 
event 
Employers’ Liability: Nil any one claim 
 
 
Indemnity to Principals: 
Covers include a standard Indemnity to Principals Clause in respect of 
contractual obligations. 
 
Full Policy: 
The policy documents should be referred to for details of full cover. 
Yours faithfully 
 
 
 
Underwriting Services 
Zurich Municipal 
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